A critique of union density as a measure of union strength in South Africa

Trade unions are widely seen to exert their power through political influence, ability to organise industrial action, financial resource allocation, and ability to exact a wage premium. However, the only direct metric for union power is union density, the proportion of employees who are members of trade unions. Upon closer examination it is doubtful whether union density is indeed a reliable indicator of union power. This conclusion is reached through several ways, first, there is little to no correlation between union density and South African policy outcomes. Second, the post-1996 agency shop agreement regime obscures the true extent of union density thereafter, and in turn does not fully capture the extent of financial resource allocation. Third, whilst union membership is conventionally seen as an obvious lever to exact wage premiums, the conditionality created by race, gender and seniority challenges this view. A speculative re-estimate of union density is conducted to show how agency shop agreements may have under-represented the true extent of union density.

J51, J53

Union density; Trade unions; Labour market; South Africa