

South Africa in North-South relationships

Address delivered by Professor S J Terreblanche, University of Stellenbosch, at a seminar on South Africa's economy and its relations with the Federal Republic of Germany, on 26 January 1982, at Klostersgut, Jakobsberg, Boppard, Federal Republic of Germany.

The recurring theme of both the Brandt Report and the Cancun Conference in Mexico was the growing income gap between the North (rich) and the South (poor) and the mounting ideological tension it generates. Coming from the South to a seminar in the North, I want to add a footnote to the so-called North-South dialogue. I propose to look at the position of Africa and South Africa in terms of North-South perspective, but in a hemispherical rather than the normal or global sense. If we regard Western Europe and Africa as a kind of "Middle Hemisphere," then it is immediately obvious that Western Europe is Africa's "North" and Africa Western Europe's "South."

South Africa can alternatively be regarded as a New Europe in Africa (or as the only remaining New Europe in Africa) or as a "northern" country in the southern part of the big southern (previously dark) continent. South Africa, however, can also be regarded as a kind of microcosm of the "Middle Hemisphere" with its own northern and southern peoples.

From a South African point of view we can distinguish between three levels of the North-South problem: the global one, the "Middle Hemispherical" one, and the South African one. A remarkable similarity exists between the problems on all these levels: the North is industrialised, educated, with high levels of income and

low population growth rates; the South is relatively undeveloped, relatively uneducated, with low (and in many cases declining) income levels and with very high population growth rates. Furthermore, the North is mainly white and the South mainly black. Table 1 gives the population, GNP and GNP *per capita* for the North and South on all three levels in 1975. It is interesting to note the close similarities between the relevant percentages on all three levels.

If we want to build a better world and prevent catastrophic developments in the South, the North will have to find solutions or formulas to alleviate the severe and mounting problems of the South. Such formulas will have to be found on all three levels.

Enough is written about the North-South problem on the first or global level. This paper concentrates on the role the North (in this case Western Europe) can play to ease the North-South tension on the second and third levels.

For the last 100 years the economic histories of Western Europe and Africa were very closely interwoven. For more or less the first three-quarters of that century Africa was intensively colonised by Western European countries. During the last quarter the African countries were politically decolonised (see map).

Perhaps it is still too early to make a proper evaluation of the merits and demerits

of Western European imperialism and decolonisation in Africa (South Africa excluded), but any discussion on the North-South relationship in the Middle Hemisphere presupposes some opinion about Western Europe's political and economic involvement in Africa.

Many people — especially from an African and South African point of view — regard both Western Europe's political and economic involvements in Africa as very unfortunate for Africa. Perhaps the negative effect of Western Europe's involvement in Africa is mainly the result of the fact that the direct and active forms of colonisation started too late and ended too early, and because the process was a case of too much imperialism and too little colonisation and Europeanisation.

In the case of South Africa the result of colonisation and decolonisation is probably more positive. In our case it started much earlier and on a relatively intensive scale (compared with other African countries). Given the large vested interests of Western Europe and of Western European people in South Africa, "colonisation" — in the sense of Europeanisation — is still maintained. The positive value of this earlier start and the continuing involvement of European people in South Africa cannot easily be overestimated.

I do not contend that colonialism and imperialism are positive phenomena. History furnishes proof of good and bad

Table 1
POPULATION, GNP AND GNP PER CAPITA COMPARED
1975

	Population		GNP		GNP per capita	
	million	%	1 000 million \$	%	\$	%
World						
First World	710	18	3 660	72	5 155	100
Second World	1 270	33	1 500	30	1 181	23
Third World	1 925	49	940	18	488	9,5
Total	3 905	100	5 050	100	1 293	—
First or global North-South level						
North (First World)	710	27	3 660	80	5 185	100
South (Third World)	1 925	73	940	20	488	9,5
Total	2 635	100	4 600	100	1 745	—
Second or "Middle Hemispheric" level						
North (Western Europe)	335	46	1 345	91	4 015	100
South (Africa)	390	54	131	9	335	8,3
Total	725	100	1 476	100	2 035	—
Third or South African level						
North (non-blacks)	7	28	24	75	3 428	100
South (blacks)	18	72	8	25	445	13
Total	25	100	32	100	1 280	—

Source: *World Bank Atlas*, population, *per capita* product and growth rates. 1977.

forms of colonialism. Africa's experience of Western European colonialism seems to be rather unlucky. It put a process of modernisation and Europeanisation into motion that destabilised the authentic cultures and living patterns of Africa, but this process does not seem to be strong enough to maintain a healthy process of growth, development and modernisation. The final result of the European involvement in Africa is a population explosion, an unattainable spiral of rising expectations and political and cultural instability. The economic, political and organisational infrastructures created in the colonial period and adapted in the post-colonial period are still badly adapted and dysfunctional to the needs of the African situation. It will take a long time before — if ever — some kind of equilibrium is restored in Africa as far as an own purpose, and func-

tional social, economic and political institutions, are concerned.

Joan Robinson, a well-known British economist, may have had Africa in mind when she wrote that: "The misery of being exploited by capitalists (of the Western world) is nothing compared to the misery of not being exploited at all," or, if put in a different way, "... it is nothing compared to the misery of not being exploited in a proper way for a reasonably long period of time."

There can be no doubt about the misery in Africa. The present *per capita* GNP of Africa is estimated at less than 600 dollars, while the *per capita* GNP in Western Europe is presently more than 7 000 dollars, and that of South Africa 2 200 dollars. Unfortunately income is divided much more unequally in the South than in the North. Consequently more than 50

percent of the population of Africa lives in absolute poverty or below the so-called Basic Human Needs line.

In South Africa income is also divided rather unequally. A slow process to close the gaps is undoubtedly under way, but at too slow a tempo (see Table 2).

In a recent report of the United Nations (A/36/513) the desperate situation in Africa is described as follows:

"As the world enters into the third decade of global development strategy, Africa remains, by any standard, the least developed of the developing regions. It has 21 of the 31 least developed countries, and several other countries are close to the margin. It has the lowest gross domestic product and the lowest net capital formation. Although the African region suffers from endemic diseases of the cruelest type, it

has the fewest doctors and fewest hospital beds; the infant mortality rate is high and life expectancy low. Africa has the highest rate of illiteracy. The greater part of African countries are unable to feed their population Africa has the greatest number of refugees, and a large population of disabled persons. Unemployment in urban areas has reached unacceptable levels. All of this, and more, has brought, and continues to bring, untold sorrow and misery to large segments of the population."

The peaceful and prosperous future expected for Africa as its states become independent has not materialised. There have been 20 major wars and 55 violent changes of government since 1952. Thirty-two states are ruled by one-party dictatorships, some reasonably benevolent. Nine countries are under military rule. Instability has become endemic in Africa.¹ Before the Second World War Africa was a net exporter of cereals. Now African countries import more than 12-million tons.

At the first Economic Summit Conference of the OAU at Lagos in April 1980, the Secretary-General of the OAU, Edem Kodjo, stated quite bluntly: "Africa is in deadly danger, its survival is at stake, yes Africa is dying." There can be no doubt about the truth of this statement. Africa north of the Limpopo is dying in more than one sense of the word.

Colin Legum, leading British expert on African affairs, predicts that "Africa's post-colonial conditions of political instability will, if anything, be greater in the 1980s than in the two previous decades."

Erich Leistner of the Africa Institute writes as follows:

"Even with the best intentions, Africa's leaders have little hope of avoiding a disastrous course. Too much is against them Whatever the personal merits of these leaders, the fact is that they have inherited social and economic structures from colonial times, which, in important respects, militate against the balanced and self-reliant development of their countries. On top of that they have to deal with two awesome crises: the Malthusian crisis of an exploding population and the crisis of uncertainty over appropriate socio-cultural values Africa has no hope, however, of dealing successfully with (its economic crisis) as long as it does not come to grips with the real issue, that is, the task

Table 2

AVERAGE HOUSEHOLD INCOME PER RACIAL GROUP IN SOUTH AFRICA

1971 and 1980

	1971		1980	
	R	Index	R	Index
Whites	7 428	100	10 944	147
Coloureds	2 544	100	4 128	162
Asians	3 828	100	6 060	158
Blacks	876	100	1 632	186

Source: *Trends*. Bureau of Economic Research. Stellenbosch. September 1981. p 4.2.

Table 3

POPULATION GROWTH OF THE MIDDLE HEMISPHERE

	1970 million	1980 million	2000 million	Growth rate 1970 to 2000 %
Western Europe (North)	330	345	370	0,4
Africa (South) ¹	330	440	760	2,8
South Africa ²	22	28	45	2,4
Blacks	15,4	20,3	34,8	2,8
Whites	3,8	4,4	5,3	1,1
Coloureds	2,1	2,5	3,7	1,9
Asians	0,7	0,8	1,2	1,8
Total	682	813	1 175	1,8

1 South Africa excluded.
2 Estimates by Professor J L Sadie.

Source: United Nations. *World Population trends and prospects by country*. 1950 to 2000.

of evolving patterns of values, thought and conduct that will enable the people of this continent to handle what is commonly referred to as the development problem."²

The Executive Secretary of the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), Dr Adebayo Adedeji, warned in 1979:

"... it is imperative for us to seek alternative patterns of development and lifestyles before it is too late. Africa is now more than ever dependent on the outside world, not only in respect of skills, capital, entrepreneurship and food, but also in respect of ideas as to the opera-

tional meaning of socio-economic developments and how it should be brought about."²

What is the responsibility of Western Europe and South Africa towards Africa's demanding problems — taking into consideration the poverty, the misery, the instability and the slow death of Africa?

Apart from the geographical unity, a rather close inter-relationship between Africa and Western Europe has developed in recent history. From an economic point of view the dependence of Africa and South Africa on Western Europe is enormous. Western Europe in its turn is of

course much less dependent on Africa and South Africa.

Let us compare the North and the South in the Middle Hemisphere. Africa (South Africa consistently excluded) has one-tenth of the world's population, one-twentieth of the land surface, but produces only one-fourtieth of the world's output and has only one-twenty-fifth part of the world trade. Western Europe has one-twelfth of the world population, only one-fiftieth of the land surface, produces two-ninths of the world's output, and is responsible for nearly half of the world trade.

The population explosion in Africa is illustrated in Table 3. In 1970 the population of Africa (South Africa excluded) and Western Europe were both more or less 330-million. After 10 years Africa's population is nearly a 100-million more than that of Western Europe and it may be 400-million more by the year 2000!

Table 4 gives the merchandise trade patterns of relevant countries and regions on a percentage basis. The great

dependence of Africa on Western Europe (and on the First World at large) is very obvious: in 1978, 53 percent of Africa's exports went to Western Europe and 62 percent of its imports were from Western Europe.

Looking at the trade pattern between the North and South in the Middle Hemisphere from Europe's point of view, we see a picture that looks completely different. Only 6 percent of Western Europe's exports went to Africa and only 5 percent of its imports were from Africa (South Africa excluded).

South Africa's dependence on Western Europe is even greater than that of Africa. Fifty percent of its exports and 60 percent of its imports were to and from Western Europe. Nearly 7,5 percent of South Africa's merchandise exports were to Africa, while only 3 percent of the imports were from Africa. In 1980 South Africa's exports to African countries increased to more than R1-billion or 10 percent of the total.

Although the economic interdependence between Africa and Europe is asymmetric, there can be no doubt about Western Europe's responsibility towards Africa. Several reasons can be given for this:

—Firstly, the countries of Western Europe are the ex-colonial powers of Africa. Given the nearly bankrupt and disruptive legacy they left Africa in the overhasty decolonisation process after the Second World War, the Western European countries had to shoulder a great part of the blame for the present misery in Africa;

—Secondly, Western Europe's multinational firms are still very active in Africa in the exploitation of very lucrative projects. In many cases the terms of the contracts and the ensuing activities are out of all reasonable proportions in favour of the multi-nationals. In the long run this state of affairs cannot be maintained;

—Thirdly, in the ideological confrontation

Table 4

EXPORTS BY DESTINATION, 1978

From	To	Western Europe %	Industrialised world (First World) %	Eastern trading bloc %	Developing areas (Third World) %	Africa (S A excluded) %	South Africa %	Total 1 000 \$ US
Western Europe		(65,9)	76,0	6,0	18,0	(6,1)	(0,8)	562 940
Africa (S A excluded)		(53,1)	84,6	3,9	11,3	(4,2)	(0,6)	52 000
South Africa ¹		(49,6)	82,0	2,8 ²	15,2	(7,4)	—	8 635

1 Gold export not included.


2 Eastern trading bloc plus unallocated.

IMPORTS BY ORIGIN

To	From	Western Europe %	Industrialised world (First World) %	Eastern trading bloc %	Developing areas (Third World) %	Africa (S A excluded) %	South Africa %	Total 1 000 \$ US
Western Europe		(65,1)	70,7	4,1	25,3	(4,9)	(0,8)	567 770
Africa (S A excluded)		(62,3)	80,2	3,6	13,4	(4,0)	(1,7)	54 910
South Africa		(59,4)	90,5	4,3 ¹	5,2	(3,0)	—	7 450

1 Eastern bloc plus unallocated.

Source: *International Trade 1978/79*. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Geneva. 1979.



Gold bars stored in the vaults of the South African Reserve Bank. South Africa is the Free World's largest supplier of gold, platinum, gem diamonds, chrome, vanadium, manganese and andalusite.

between East and West, Africa is of enormous strategic value to Western Europe and to the West in general;

—Fourthly, and most importantly, Western Europe has from a moral and human rights point of view an inescapable responsibility to rescue the dying continent.

The situation in Africa is already so desperate that there can no longer be any doubt about Western Europe's (and the rest of the Western World's) responsibility towards rescuing Africa. Given the desperate conditions in Africa, the only operational question ought to be the forms of rescue measures that will be appropriate in the circumstances. In this connection the Official Development Aid (ODA) of Western countries and the Lomé arrangement of the European Economic Community are important steps in the right direction. None the less they are far from adequate. Even if these forms of aid are increased, they will still be inadequate. Several other forms of aid will have to be

implemented before the rescue attempts can be successful.

Four aspects may be considered:

—Firstly, a completely new approach or philosophy towards aid will have to be formulated by the Western World. At present ODA to Southern countries accounts for less than a half percent of Northern countries' GNP. This is totally insufficient. To formulate a new aid programme or policy, Western Europe (and the rest of the Western world) will have to get rid of their deep-rooted inclination to view the world almost solely through the glasses of their own national self-interest. The nation-state idea is not as sacred as the countries of the Western world are inclined to think. Just as the Ancién Regime gave way to the bourgeois democracy of the nineteenth century, and as it again gave way to the mass democracy of the twentieth century, so the mainly inward-looking concept of the nation-state will have to be adapted in a rather fundamental way to

meet the challenges of the next century. It is quite hypocritical for governments in the Western world to be very strong on the idea of universal human rights and simultaneously protect and foster their national self-interests in a nearly unqualified way. Sooner or later this sharp contradiction between *universal* rights and *national* interests will have to be removed. Northern countries will have to give a new content to the nation-state idea and to their responsibilities towards the poorer countries. Out of this new content a new philosophy concerning development aid may crystallise.

—Secondly, people from Western European countries will have to get more *directly* involved in the development and rescue projects. Hundreds and thousands of teachers, engineers, doctors, nurses, administrative personnel, etc, will have to work for long periods in different forms of "peace corps" operations. If this is regarded as a disguised form of cultural imperialism, it will be a

pty, because Africa cannot be rescued without it.

—Thirdly, strangely enough, Western European people, with the necessary empathy for the people of Africa, will have to *assist* Africa in attempts to conceptualise a development idea or target that will be functional in the Africa situation.

—Fourthly, attempts to rescue the dying part of the Middle Hemisphere can only succeed if the potential of South Africa is used to a far greater extent than at pre-

sent. Any large-scale attempt to rescue Africa without the strategic contribution South Africa can make is doomed to fail.

As a Northern-orientated country in the far south of the Middle Hemisphere, the North must regard South Africa as a kind of gateway or bridge-head that will not only make it possible but also easier to rescue at least the southern part of the great Southern continent. The whites and the coloureds in South Africa are in the unique position that they are almost the

only people in the world that are European and African at the same time. They are standing — so to speak — with one foot in Europe and the other in Africa. Given their conceptualisation of the African scene and their knowledge and experience of and their interest in Africa, they are in the key position to make an invaluable contribution to bridge the conceptual, the income and the development gaps between Western Europe and Africa. In supporting South Africa the West can strengthen the ability of the European and

Table 5

SOUTH AFRICAN IMPORTS

	1970		1975		1980		Growth rate
	R-million	%	R-million	%	R-million	%	
Western Europe	1 393	54,7	3 275	58,8	5 700	40,3	15,13
Americas	516	20,3	1 110	20,0	2 109	14,9	15,12
Asia	410	16,1	789	14,3	1 774	12,5	15,78
Africa	131	5,1	254	4,6	290	2,1	8,27
Rest and unclassified	98	3,8	130	2,3	4 270	30,0	—
(West Germany)	(374)	(14,7)	1 034	(18,5)	(1 864)	(13,2)	17,42
Total imports	2 547	100	5 568	100	14 152	100	18,71
% of GDP	25,8	—	21,5	—	24,4	—	—

Table 6

SOUTH AFRICAN EXPORTS

	1970		1975		1980		Growth rate 1970/80
	R-million	%	R-million	%	R-million	%	
Western Europe	794	51,4	2 161	54,2	5 151	45,7	20,6
Americas	177	11,5	631	15,8	2 147	19,0	28,3
Asia	219	14,2	702	17,6	1 994	17,7	24,7
Africa	264	17,1	424	10,6	1 098	9,7	15,3
Rest	89	5,8	72	1,8	880	7,8	25,8
(West Germany)	(109)	(7,1)	(427)	(10,7)	(800)	(7,1)	22,1
Total merchandise export	1 543	100	3 990	100	11 270	100	22
Gold bullion	837	—	2 540	—	8 652	—	26,3
Total exports	2 380	—	6 538	—	19 922	—	23,7
% of GDP	20,7	—	25,3	—	34,3	—	—

Source: Department of Customs and Excise and South African Reserve Bank.

"modern"-orientated people in Africa to assist the African people on the material as well as the spiritual level.

Relative to the rest of Africa, economic development in South Africa can be regarded as healthy. In the nearly four decades since the Second World War the average growth rate of the *per capita* GNP was almost 2 percent per year. If South Africa's relatively high population growth rate is taken into account, this compares quite favourably with the Western European countries' average growth rate of 3 percent *per capita*. In Tables 5 and 6 more detail about South African imports and exports in 1970, 1975 and 1980 is given. In 1970, 17 percent of South Africa's exports went to Africa. Because of unfavourable political developments — from a South African point of view — this percentage declined to 8 percent in 1978, but increased to 10 percent in 1980. South Africa's exports to West Germany maintain an average of more than 7 percent of all exports, while an average 15 percent of South Africa's imports are from West Germany.

In Table 7 the foreign investment in South Africa — distinguished by region — for 1979 is given. The investment of the EEC is 56,2 percent of the total and that of the Western world nearly 90 percent. The direct and non-direct investment is more or less of equal size. From 1965 to 1979 foreign investment in real terms increased at an annual rate of 7,3 percent.

The positive role South Africa is already playing in the development of many

African countries is well-known. To mention only a few:

- South Africa is the only developed, modernised and industrialised country in Africa and the only one that is, in any way, acquainted with technical and development problems that are unique to Africa. In this capacity South Africa can supply and indeed supplies many African states with valuable — and in many cases to them indispensable — technical, medical, educational and other forms of aid and advice;
- South Africa creates job opportunities for thousands of job-seekers from its neighbouring countries;
- Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland (the so-called BLS countries) and other independent states (like Zimbabwe and Malawi) are economically and financially very dependent on South Africa. The governments of the BLS countries obtain an average of more than 60 percent of their own income from the customs union with South Africa. This customs union is to a high degree favouring the BLS countries;
- The importance of the South African transport and harbour facilities to several countries in southern Africa — including Mozambique and Zimbabwe — is a well-acknowledged fact;
- South Africa is a regional power with political, military and economic stability and as such is a stronghold in a sea of instability and uncertainty. The indirect value of this position to countries in southern Africa is normally not ap-

preciated in Western Europe, mainly because of the very negative image that has been created of South Africa;

- The importance of South Africa for Western Europe (and the rest of the Western world) is normally stated in terms of three factors, namely the South African mineral resources, the Cape Sea Route and the beneficial trade and investment possibilities. I want to add a fourth — and to my mind a more important — factor, namely the strategic value of a growing modern sector in South Africa for the development process in the South African periphery and on the whole African subcontinent.

The best way to appreciate the role South Africa is playing in the development of certain African countries is to imagine what will happen if the often predicted revolution or explosion did take place. This is an eventuality that, in the words of a previous Prime Minister, "... is too ghastly to contemplate." If a full-scale revolution did take place, it will in all probability escalate to a condition of complete chaos. Then not only South Africa, but the whole subcontinent, will degenerate into one of the worst poverty-stricken regions in the world in which ethnic and hunger-wars will be rife. This will create, in due time, a burden of unthinkable dimensions for the Western world.

But let us be more positive. Although South Africa already plays a positive role in the development of many African countries, potentially it can play a much greater role. What is necessary to fully mobilise South Africa's potential? Apart from the maintenance of law and order and a high growth rate, South Africa's potential as a catalyst of development in the subcontinent can only be fully realised if the process of internal reform can be stepped up and better relations can be created with the black countries of southern Africa.

The North can play an important role to convince African states of the value of more friendly relations with South Africa. The African states must realise that in their present state of desperate poverty they cannot allow themselves the luxury of all the high-sounding ideological rhetoric. Mr Etheridge, Executive Director, Anglo American Corporation, puts it as follows:

"The North has an important part to play in finding a compromise for survival in Southern Africa, a part it cannot escape. Many Northern states have been dishonest in that they have public-

Table 7

FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA
DISTINGUISHED BY REGION, 1979

	R-million	%
EEC	12 868	56,2
Rest of Europe	2 670	11,7
America (North and South)	5 290	23,1
Africa	689	3,0
Asia	465	2,0
Oceania	113	0,5
International Organisations	548	2,4
Unallocated	237	1,1
Total	22 880	100,0

Source: South African Reserve Bank. Quarterly Bulletin. December 1981.

ly encouraged the South in their enmity towards South Africa while privately bemoaning the fact that these states are an enormous burden and are heading for economic disaster. Now the North has to find a way to bring South Africa into an alignment with the other states. *Frankly, I believe that the North should be blunt with the South, not only in regard to South Africa but to the general need to put economics before politics and butter before guns until they can stand on their own feet.*"¹

Much has already been written and spoken about the reform process in South Africa. The most common complaint is that too little is done too late. I am not going to dispute the truth of this statement. There can be no doubt about the political, social and economic reform that is needed and in many cases already long overdue. If all the necessary and relevant reforms can be brought about, they will add up to a kind of structural change. But to do the things that ought to be done in proper time, will also necessitate a kind of (constitutional) structural change. South Africa is in a certain sense caught up in a "catch 22 situation." We need structural change — both as a result of reform and/or as a precondition for reform. A considerable pressure for reform is building up, but at the same time the resistance within the present institutional structure is quite formidable and cannot be ignored if we want to maintain law and order. Fortunately we

have good reason to believe that the economic forces in favour of reform will at least in the long run (if a relatively high growth rate can be maintained) be much stronger than the social and political forces that want to maintain the *status quo*.


What South Africa wants from Western Europe (and the Western world at large) is not sanctions and pressures that may have disruptive effects. South Africa needs as much financial, economic, technical and cultural support as possible to enable it to maintain the highest possible growth rate. While trade with and investment in South Africa has proved to be very beneficial and very secure for Western Europe, the higher growth rate that it supported was of more than ordinary importance to South Africa. Apart from enabling South Africa to create better living conditions for its large and rapidly growing population, the high growth rate has proved to be an important agent for reform.

Many reasons can be given for the important reforms that did take place in the last two decades. Of all these reasons the pressures created by the rapid growing economy were by far the most important. These pressures changed outmoded social and economic patterns and conservative ideas and thought patterns. In an attempt to maintain a growth rate of about five percent in real terms during the previous two decades, much of the unnecessary protection and many privileges of the whites were done away with.

Many of the reforms in South Africa are painful for certain white groups because they had to make "sacrifices" in terms of certain vested interests. However, it is quite logical that such changes can be brought about more easily in a growing than in a stagnant economy. What happened in the labour and educational fields in the last few years were a direct result of the demands of a growing economy. The reforms in terms of the Riekert and Wiehahn reports were unthinkable without the shortage of skilled labour.

If South Africa wants to maintain a growth rate of 5 percent in the next two decades, the demand for skilled labour will be nearly insatiable. To maintain a 5 percent growth rate will necessitate an educational revolution as far as blacks are concerned and an opening up of social and economic opportunities on an unprecedented scale. According to my colleague, Professor J L Sadie, South Africa will need 400 000 persons in executive positions in the year 2000 instead of the present 170 000, 1,5-million highly-skilled workers instead of the present 500 000, and 1,6-million semi-skilled white-collar workers instead of the present 400 000.

If the most optimistic projection in connection with the training and promotion of whites were attained in the next 20 years, then the annual needed addition of workers other than whites will be as in column of Table 8. While only 300 non-



Several countries in southern Africa depend on South Africa's transport and harbour facilities.




Table 8

GROSS ANNUAL REQUIRED ADDITION TO LABOUR FORCE OTHER THAN WHITES

	1959 to 1979	1980 to 2000	Annual required increase
	Column 1 (actual)	Column 2 (required)	Column 3
White collar			
Executive	300	3 800	13X
Highly-skilled	8 000	48 000	6X
Less-skilled	18 000	52 000	3X
Sub-total	26 300	103 800	4X
Blue collar			
Skilled	5 000	15 000	3X
Semi-skilled	56 000	101 000	2X
Sub-total	61 000	116 000	2X
Total	87 300	219 800	2,5X

Source: J L Sadie: Labour force 2000, in *RSA 2000, Dialogue with the future*. HSRC. Vol 3. No 2. 1981. p 20 to 34.

whites were added to the executive category in the period 1959 to 1979, nearly 4 000 will have to be added annually in the next 20 years. While only 8 000 highly-skilled non-white workers were added annually to the labour force during the previous 20 years, nearly 50 000 will have to be added annually during the next 20 years.

There can be no doubt that a high economic growth rate will bring about fundamental social, economic, educational and in all probability also political changes in South Africa. If it were to the economic benefit of Western Europe to invest and trade with South Africa, then Western Europe can be assured that such actions will not only be to the benefit of all the

people of South Africa but also to the benefit of many countries in southern Africa. With economic growth as the main agent of change in South and southern Africa, investors in Western Europe can have a very positive effect on developments on the subcontinent if they show continued and even greater confidence in South Africa.

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(cont from p 77. *South Africa: an international issue*)

minds as considerations of discipline could determine what is being said in public.

Any serious attempt to prepare the ground for a possible settlement on the basis of separation of apartheid and national identity therefore should come from the outside and would require absolute impartiality, a high degree of tolerance; it would be a highly delicate affair requiring a deep sense of responsibility. It should be made clear to the whites that the separation of identity from domination is their on-

ly chance to persist as a national community. To the blacks it should be made clear that by this sort of solution their sovereignty could be established without economically ruining the country, since the cooperation of the whites is indispensable for keeping the economy going.

The problem in its implications is an international one; the settlement therefore could take place under international supervision only and would need an international guarantee. The attitude of the leading circles in South Africa might be in-

fluenced by the hope to count on the USA for support due to the economic and geopolitical importance of South Africa. However true that might be, the Third World cannot be considered as committed finally to one or the other global power and the interest of the USA and the West as a whole to maintain or to establish relations of cooperation with black Africa is indisputable. Because of that it is highly unlikely that the USA would support South Africa at the price of jeopardising its relations with black Africa.

HENNENHOFER PR

Die Interdependenz zwischen der südafrikanischen
Wirtschaft und der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung
in Afrika und der westlichen Welt

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HENNENHOFER PR

Ein immer wiederkehrendes Thema, sowohl im Brandt-Bericht als auch auf der Konferenz von Calcún in Mexico, ist der wachsende Einkommensunterschied zwischen dem "reichen" Norden und dem "armen" Süden und die sich daraus ergebenden ständig wachsenden ideologischen Spannungen. Ich möchte vorschlagen, die Lage Afrikas und Südafrikas im Sinne der Nord-Süd-Perspektive zu sehen, nicht in dem normalen oder globalen, sondern in einem "hemisphärischen" Sinn. Wenn wir West-Europa und Afrika als eine Art "mittlere Hemisphäre" betrachten, dann wird sofort klar, daß West-Europa Afrikas "Norden", und daß Afrika West-Europas "Süden" ist. In diesem Rahmen kann Südafrika mit seinen eigenen nördlichen und südlichen Völkern als eine Art Mikrokosmos der "mittleren Hemisphäre" betrachtet werden.

Aus der Sicht Südafrikas können wir drei Ebenen des Nord-Süd-Problems unterscheiden:
die weltumspannende globale, die "mittel hemisphärische" und die südafrikanische. Die Schwierigkeiten auf allen drei Ebenen ähneln sich in bemerkenswerter Weise.

Wenn wir eine bessere Welt schaffen und Katastrophen im Süden vermeiden wollen, muß der (reiche) Norden Lösungen oder Rezepte finden, um die ernstesten und zunehmenden Probleme des Südens zu mildern. Diese Rezepte müssen auf allen drei Ebenen gefunden werden.

Genug ist über das Nord-Süd-Problem auf der ersten oder weltweiten Ebene geschrieben worden. Ich möchte mich darauf konzentrieren, welche Rolle der Norden (in diesem Falle West-Europa) spielen kann, um die Nord-Süd-Spannungen auf der zweiten und dritten Ebene zu entlasten.

Bei der ersten Wirtschafts-Gipfelkonferenz der OAU in Lagos im April 1980 hat der Generalsekretär der OAU, Edem Kodjo, ganz unverblümt festgestellt: "Afrika ist in tödlicher Gefahr, sein Überleben steht auf dem Spiel, ja, Afrika stirbt." Es gibt keinen Zweifel an der Wahrheit dieser Feststellung. Afrika, nördlich des Limpopo, stirbt in mehr als einem Sinne des Wortes.

Welche Verantwortung haben West-Europa und Südafrika im Hinblick auf die drängenden Probleme Afrikas, wenn man die Armut, das Elend, die Instabilität und den angeblichen langsamen Tod von Afrika in Betracht zieht?

Abgesehen von der geographischen Einheit, hat sich in jüngster Zeit eine ziemlich enge Wechselbeziehung zwischen Afrika und West-Europa entwickelt. Aus wirtschaftlicher Sicht ist die Abhängigkeit Afrikas und Südafrikas von West-Europa gewaltig. West-Europa dagegen ist natürlich viel weniger abhängig von Afrika und Südafrika. 1970 hatten Afrika (ohne Südafrika) und West-Europa eine Bevölkerungszahl von mehr oder weniger 330 Millionen. In zehn Jahren wird Afrikas Bevölkerung die Europas um 100 Millionen

übertreffen, und im Jahr 2000 werden es gar 400 Millionen mehr Menschen sein. Die Tabelle vermittelt einen Einblick in die Handelsbeziehungen wichtiger Länder und Regionen auf Prozentbasis. Die große Abhängigkeit Afrikas und Südafrikas von West-Europa (und von den Industrieländern insgesamt) ist mehr als offensichtlich.

Obwohl die wirtschaftliche Wechselbeziehung zwischen Afrika und Europa asymmetrisch ist, kann kein Zweifel an der Verantwortung West-Europas gegenüber Afrika bestehen. Dafür gibt es mehrere Gründe. Die Länder West-Europas sind die Ex-Kolonialmächte Afrikas. West-Europas multinationale Konzerne sind noch immer sehr aktiv dabei, sehr lukrative Projekte in Afrika auszunutzen. In der ideologischen Konfrontation zwischen Ost und West ist Afrika von enormer strategischer Bedeutung für West-Europa und für den Westen insgesamt. Schließlich - und das ist am wichtigsten - hat West-Europa aus moralischen Gründen und im Hinblick auf die Menschenrechte eine unent-rinnbare Verantwortung gegenüber den sterbenden Völkern in Afrika.

Die Situation in Afrika ist bereits so verzweifelt, daß es einen Zweifel an der Verantwortung West-Europas (und des Rests der westlichen Welt) zur Rettung Afrikas nicht länger geben kann. Die einzige taktische Frage sollte die nach den angemessenen Rettungsmaßnahmen unter den gegebenen Umständen sein. In dieser Beziehung sind die offizielle Entwicklungshilfe der westlichen Länder und die Lomé-Vereinbarungen der

Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft wichtige Schritte in die richtige Richtung. Trotz allem sind sie weit davon entfernt, ausreichend zu sein.

Verschiedene andere Maßnahmen der Hilfe müßten realisiert werden, bevor die Rettungsversuche erfolgreich sein können. Menschen aus west-europäischen Ländern müßten viel direkter in die Entwicklung von Rettungsmaßnahmen einbezogen werden. Seltsamerweise müssen West-Europäer den Afrikanern bei deren Versuch behilflich sein, eine Entwicklungs-idee oder ein Ziel, das der afrikanischen Situation gerecht wird, zu entwerfen.

Versuche einer Rettung des sterbenden Teils der "mittleren Hemisphäre" können nur erfolgreich sein, wenn das Hilfspotential Südafrikas auf breiterer Basis genutzt wird als gegenwärtig. Jeder breit angelegte Versuch, Afrika ohne den strategischen Beitrag Südafrikas zu retten, ist zum Scheitern verurteilt. Als nördlich orientiertes Land im tiefen Süden der "mittleren Hemisphäre" muß der Norden Südafrika als eine Art Tor oder Brückenkopf betrachten, durch den allein es möglich bzw. leichter ist, zumindest den südlichen Teil des großen südlichen Kontinents zu retten. Mit der Unterstützung Südafrikas kann der Westen die Fähigkeit der Europäer und "modern" orientierten Menschen in Afrika verbessern, der afrikanischen Bevölkerung sowohl materiell als auch geistig zu helfen.

Verglichen mit Afrika scheint die ökonomische Entwicklung in Südafrika gesund zu sein. In den letzten vier Jahrzehnten nach dem 2. Weltkrieg betrug die durchschnittliche Wachstumsrate des Bruttosozialproduktes pro Kopf der Bevölkerung rund 2 %. Wenn wir unser relativ hohes Bevölkerungswachstum in Rechnung stellen, schneiden wir gegenüber westlichen europäischen Ländern ganz günstig ab. Sie halten eine durchschnittliche Wachstumsrate pro Kopf von rund 3 % im Jahr.

Die positive Rolle, die Südafrika für die Entwicklung vieler afrikanischer Länder bereits heute spielt, ist allseits bekannt. Ich erwähne nur einige:

Südafrika ist das einzig entwickelte moderne und industrialisierte Land in Afrika und das einzige, das in jeder Hinsicht mit jeglichen technischen - und Entwicklungsproblemen vertraut ist, die für Afrika typisch sind. Südafrika schafft Arbeitsplatzmöglichkeiten für Tausende von Arbeitslosen aus Nachbarländern. Botswana, Lesotho und Swasiland (die sogenannten BLS-Länder) und andere unabhängige Staaten (wie Zimbabwe und Malawi) sind wirtschaftlich und finanziell sehr abhängig von Südafrika. Die Bedeutung der südafrikanischen Verkehrswege und der Häfen für verschiedene Länder des Südlichen Afrikas - einschließlich Mozambique und Zimbabwe - ist eine anerkannte Tatsache. Schließlich ist Südafrika eine Regionalmacht mit politischer, militärischer und wirtschaftlicher Stabilität und auf diese Weise eine

Festung in einem Meer von Instabilität und Unsicherheit. Die indirekte Bedeutung dieser Position für Länder im Südlichen Afrika wird in West-Europa normalerweise wenig anerkannt, vor allem wegen des ausgesprochen negativen Images Südafrikas, das geschaffen wurde.

Obwohl Südafrika bereits eine positive Rolle bei der Entwicklung vieler afrikanischer Länder spielt, könnte es noch einen wesentlich höheren Beitrag leisten. Was ist nötig, um Südafrikas Möglichkeiten zur vollen Entfaltung zu bringen? Neben der Erhaltung von Recht und Ordnung und einer hohen Wachstumsrate, können sich Südafrikas Möglichkeiten als Katalysator der Entwicklung des Sub-Kontinents nur dann voll entfalten, wenn der Prozeß innerer Reformen voranschreitet und bessere diplomatische Beziehungen zu den schwarzen Staaten im Südlichen Afrika geschaffen werden können. Ersteres wird sehr oft als Voraussetzung für das zweite angesehen. Wenngleich dies zutreffen könnte, darf die Bedeutung eines Wandels in der Haltung afrikanischer Länder gegenüber Südafrika nicht unterschätzt werden.

Vieles ist über den Reformprozeß in Südafrika geschrieben und gesprochen worden. Dabei wird am häufigsten darüber geklagt, daß zu wenig zu spät getan wird. Ich habe nicht die Absicht, die Wahrheit dieser Feststellung zu diskutieren. Zweifellos werden politische, soziale und wirt-

schaftliche Reformen gebraucht und sind in vielen Fällen lange überfällig. Wenn alle notwendigen und wichtigen Reformen eingeleitet werden können, dann wird sich dies zu einer Art strukturellem Wandel addieren. Andererseits wird die Notwendigkeit, die Dinge, die getan werden müssen, in einem angemessenen Zeitraum zu tun, ebenfalls eine Art (konstitutionellen) strukturellen Wandel erfordern. Südafrika ist in gewisser Weise gefangen in der sogenannten "Catch 22 Situation". Glücklicherweise haben wir guten Grund zu glauben, daß die wirtschaftlichen Kräfte, die eine Reform begünstigen, langfristig stärker sein werden als die sozialen und politischen Kräfte, die den Status quo zu erhalten wünschen.

Was Südafrika von West-Europa wünscht, ist soviel finanzielle, wirtschaftliche, technische und kulturelle Unterstützung wie möglich, damit es fähig ist, die größtmögliche Wachstumsrate zu erzielen. Viele Gründe können für die bedeutenden Reformen, die in den letzten zwei Jahrzehnten vorgenommen wurden, angeführt werden. Von all diesen Gründen ist der Druck, der durch eine schnell wachsende Wirtschaft erzeugt wurde, der allerwichtigste. Dieser Druck änderte altmodische soziale und wirtschaftliche Einstellungen und konservative Ideen und Denkmuster.

Wenn Südafrika eine jährliche Wachstumsrate von 5 % in den nächsten zwei Jahrzehnten erreichen will, dann wird der Bedarf an Facharbeitern im

Grunde genommen unersättlich sein. Dies wird eine Revolution in der Erziehung der Schwarzen notwendig machen und wird ihnen soziale und wirtschaftliche Möglichkeiten von unvorhersehbarem Ausmaß eröffnen.

Es kann keinen Zweifel daran geben, daß eine hohe wirtschaftliche Wachstumsrate fundamentalen Wandel in sozialer, wirtschaftlicher, erziehungsmäßiger und aller Wahrscheinlichkeit auch in politischer Hinsicht in Südafrika bringen wird. Wenn es West-Europa wirtschaftlich nützt, in Südafrika zu investieren und mit Südafrika zu handeln, dann kann West-Europa sicher sein, daß diese Maßnahmen nicht nur allen Bevölkerungsgruppen in Südafrika zugute kommen, sondern darüber hinaus noch vielen Ländern im Südlichen Afrika.