

THE PROCESS OF CHANGE IN SOUTH AND SOUTHERN AFRICA

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THE PROCESS OF CHANGE IN SOUTH AND SOUTHERN AFRICA¹⁾

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PART I

THE SOUTH AFRICAN PROBLEM IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE

A. THREE GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES

When explaining the process of change in South Africa - both its achievement and its retarding factors - to a foreign audience, it is always useful to look at it in the one or other global perspective. I want to mention three such global perspectives and choose one of them as framework for this lecture.

1. Firstly, we can look at South Africa as the only remaining New Europe in Africa. If we look at a world map, it is remarkable that the European peninsula of the Eurasian Continent creates New Europes on both the North American and the South American continents and on the Australian Continent. Of all the potential New Europes that were created on the African (the so-called Dark) Continent, South Africa is the only remaining one. What we want to achieve in South Africa is to maintain this European settlement and to protect our Western values and civilization. We regard the maintenance of a strong Western orientated civilization and economy in South Africa as of the utmost importance, not only for the whites but also for the maintenance of order and prosperity on the whole subcontinent.
2. Secondly, we can regard South Africa as a microcosm of the macrocosm of the First and the Third Worlds. The populations of the First, Second and Third Worlds are approximately 700 m, 1300 m, 2100 m respectively. As an ex-colonial world the Third World is still part of the so-called Capitalist World System. If we do not take the Second World into account, the First World's (or the North's) population is $\frac{1}{4}$ and the Third World's (the South's) population $\frac{3}{4}$ of the Capitalistic World System.


1) This lecture is prepared for a lecture tour in Western Europe during October 1982.

South Africa (taken in its larger or original size) has a population approaching 28 million. We can regard 7 million as First World people and the remaining 21 million as Third World people (in different stages of development). This also gives us a ratio of $\frac{1}{4}$ to $\frac{3}{4}$. Defined in this manner South Africa's microcosm is equal to 1/100th of the macrocosm of the First and Third Worlds.

From a development point of view a remarkable set of structural similarities exist between the First and Third World "sectors" (or between the "cores" and the "peripheries") of the micro- and macrocosms respectively. Because of these structural similarities South Africa is not only in quantitative terms a microcosm of the macrocosm, but also, and especially, in qualitative terms. As a qualitative replica (or a pocket book edition) of the macrocosm, the South African microcosm represents, in philosophical terms, the structure and dimensions of the macrocosm and has become a kind of focal point for the problems of the world of tomorrow. In this sense the microcosm defines the urgency of the problems of the macrocosm in a concentrated and in a rather transparent way. If one takes a bird's-eye view of the structure and problems of the microcosm, it is as if it becomes a crystal ball in which one can perhaps "see" the structure and problems of the bigger world of tomorrow. If one looks into the crystal ball the inevitability of a structural change to a new order in both cosms seems rather clear cut. This is perhaps one of the most important similarities between them. An important difference between the two cosms is that the timespan in which such a structural change can be brought about in a peaceful way is considerably shorter in the case of the South African microcosm.

Another difference is that the macrocosm consists of 120 - 140 odd independent countries while the microcosm is only one political unity (if we do not take the Transkei, Buphuthatwana, etc. into account). If I had had the necessary time at my disposal I could have put forward a strong argument that the "nation state" dimension is from a structural and long-term view not as important as people may like to believe.

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In both cases the "cores" (or the Northern part) are highly industrialized, with high agricultural productivity, a highly schooled and mainly White population, a high level of per capita income and a low level of population growth. Both the "peripheral sectors" (or the Southern part) are relatively unindustrialized, with low productivity in agriculture, a mainly non-White population, a relatively low level of education, low levels of per capita income and very high population growth rates.

3. If we regard Western Europe and Africa as a kind of "Middle Hemisphere" - parallel to the Western Hemisphere of the Americas - in which Western Europe forms the "North" and Africa the "South", then we can thirdly regard South Africa as a microcosm of the Middle Hemisphere with its own "Developed North" and its own "Developing South".

The growing confrontation between the North and the South has been articulated in several scholarly publications in the last few years. The Hammersjold, the Rio- and the Brand reports (and the Cancún Conference) emphasize the shrinking of the planet and the growing interdependence between nations - especially between the First and the Third World. All these reports (and the Cancún Conference) contain a severe warning that the world will collapse catastrophically if it is not possible to find one or another kind of global solution that will change the structure of the international order in such a way that the net flow of wealth will be from the core to the periphery. They see great dangers if wealth continues to flow from the periphery to the core as may be the case between several countries situated in the South and North respectively.

If we want to build a better world and if we want to prevent catastrophic developments in the South, the (rich) North will have to find solutions or formulas to alleviate the severe and mounting problems of the South on the following three levels:

- (a) i.e. the South (or Third World) of the global macrocosm.

(b) Africa as the South of the Middle Hemisphere

(c) and in the "Southern part" (i.e. mainly the Black part) of the South African microcosm.

B. THE EFFECT OF EUROPEAN IMPERIALISM (COLONIALISM) IN AFRICA

Enough has been written about the North-South problem on the first, or global level. Being in Western Europe, I want to concentrate on the role the North (in this case Western Europe) can play to ease the North-South tension on the second and third levels, i.e. in black Africa and in black South Africa.

For the last 100 years the economic histories of Western Europe and Africa were very closely interwoven. For more or less the first three quarters of that century Africa was intensively colonized by Western European countries. During the last quarter the African countries were politically decolonized. (See Map)

Perhaps it is still too early to make a proper evaluation of the merits and demerits of Western European imperialism and decolonization in Africa (S.A. excluded), but any discussion on the North-South relationship in the Middle Hemisphere presupposes some opinion about Western Europe's political and economic involvement in Africa.

Many people - especially from an African and South African point of view - regard both Western Europe's political and its economic involvements in Africa as very unfortunate for Africa. Perhaps the negative effect of Western Europe's involvement in Africa is mainly the result of the fact that the direct and active forms of colonization start too late and end too early, and because the process was too much a case of imperialism and too little one of colonization and Europeanization.

In the case of South Africa, the result of colonization and decolonization is probably more positive. In our case it started much earlier and on a relatively more intensive scale (compared with other African countries). Given the large vested interests of Western Europe and of Western European people in South Africa, "colonization" - in the sense of Europeanization -

is still maintained. The positive value of this earlier start and the continuing involvement of European people in South Africa cannot easily be overestimated because it transformed South Africa into a real New Europe comparable with the other New Europes in the Americas and in Australia and New Zealand.

Do not misunderstand me. I do not contend that colonialism and imperialism are positive phenomena. History furnishes proof of good and bad forms of colonialism. Africa's experience of Western European colonialism seems to be rather, unlucky. It put a process of modernisation and Europeanization into motion that destabilized the authentic cultures and living patterns of Africa but this process does not seem to be strong enough to maintain a healthy process of growth, development and modernization. The end result of the European involvement in Africa is a population explosion, a disruption of rather stable political and social patterns, and unattainable spiral of rising expectations and political and cultural instability. The economic, political and organisational infrastructures and living patterns and attitudes created in the colonial period and adapted in the post-colonial period, are still very badly adapted and dysfunctional to the needs of the African situation. It will take a long, long time before - if ever - some kind of equilibrium is restored in Africa as far as an own purpose and functional social, economic and political institutions are concerned.

G. THE POVERTY AND REGRESSIVE DEVELOPMENTS IN AFRICA

There can be no doubt about the misery in Africa. The present per capita GNP of Africa is estimated at less than \$ 500, while the per capita GNP in Western Europe is presently more than \$ 7000, and that of South Africa \$ 2200. Unfortunately income is divided much more unequally in the South than in the North. Consequently more than 50 per cent of the population of Africa lives in absolute poverty or below the so-called Basic Human Needs line.

There can also be no doubt about the political instability

in the African states that were given (so-called) independence with democratic constitutions after the Second World War. Since 1952 not less than 55 successful coup d'état have taken place in Africa. It is really high time for the Western World to realise that democracy is a luxury product of the relative highly industrialized countries of the First World that cannot be exported to the Third World and especially not to Africa. (To put it in a figurative language: democracy is a Ford car that is conspicuously not suited for the rough roads of Africa.)

At the first Economic Summit Conference of the OAU at Lagos, in April 1980, the Secretary-General of the OAU, Edem Kodjo, stated quite bluntly: "Africa is in deadly danger, its survival is at stake, yes Africa is dying." There can be no doubt about the truth of this statement. Africa north of the Limpopo is dying in more than one sense of the word. The poverty and the regressive developments in Africa are articulated in alarming and unambiguous language in the latest report of the World Bank.

The population explosion in Africa is illustrated in Table 1. In 1970 the population of Africa (South Africa excluded) and Western Europe were both more or less 330 million. After 10 years Africa's population is nearly 100 million more than that of Western Europe and it may be 400 million more by the year 2000!

TABLE 1

POPULATION GROWTH OF THE MIDDLE HEMISPHERE

	1970	1980	2000	Growth rate 1970-2000
	mill.	mill.	mill.	%
Western Europe (North)	330	345	370	0,4
Africa (South) ²⁾	330	440	760	2,8
South Africa	22	28	45	2,4
Blacks	15,4	20,3	34,8	2,8
Whites	3,8	4,4	5,3	1,1
Coloured	2,1	2,5	3,7	1,9
Asian	0,7	0,8	1,2	1,8
Total	682	813	1175	1,8

Source: United Nations: World Population trends and prospects by country, 1950 - 2000.

D. WESTERN EUROPE'S RESPONSIBILITY TOWARDS AFRICA

I think it is very important that people and countries in Western Europe start to ask themselves the following question: What is the responsibility of Western Europe (and South Africa) towards Africa's alarming problems - taking into consideration both the growing poverty, the immense misery, the instability and the slow death of Africa on the one hand and the long and close historic links between Western Europe and Africa on the other hand.

Let us take a close look at Western Europe (and the rest of the Western World's) responsibility towards Africa:

Firstly, the countries of Western Europe are the ex-colonial powers of Africa. Given the nearly bankrupt and disruptive legacy they left Africa in the overhasty decolonization process after the Second World War, the Western European countries have to shoulder a great part of the blame for the present misery in Africa.

Secondly, Western Europe's multi-national firms are still very active in Africa in the exploitation of very lucrative projects. In many cases the terms of the contracts and the ensuing activities are out of all reasonable proportions in favour of the multi-nationals. In the long run this state of affairs cannot be maintained.

Thirdly, in the ideological confrontation between East and West, Africa is of enormous strategic value to Western Europe and to the West in general.

Finally, and most importantly, Western Europe has from a moral and human rights point of view an inescapable responsibility to rescue the dying Continent.

The situation in Africa is already so desperate that there can no longer be any doubt about Western Europe's (and the rest of the Western World's) responsibility towards rescuing Africa. Given the desperate conditions in Africa, the only operational question ought to be concerned with the forms of rescue-measures that will be appropriate in the circumstances. In this connection

the Official Development Aid (ODA) of Western countries and the Lomé arrangement of the European Economic Community are important steps in the right direction. Nonetheless they are far from adequate. Even if these forms of aid are increased, they will still be inadequate. Several other forms of aid will have to be implemented before the rescue attempts can be successful.

I want to mention four things that must be taken into account in the formulation and execution of an appropriate aid programme towards Africa:

Firstly, a new philosophy towards development aid will have to be formulated in which the short-term national self-interest of the donor countries will have to play a smaller role. At present less than $\frac{1}{2}$ % of the GNP of Northern Countries is given as O.D.A. to the Third World countries. To formulate a new aid programme, people in Western Europe (and in the rest of the Western World) will have to get rid of their deep-rooted attitude of looking at the world through the glasses of the nation state-idea and its short-term self-interests. This nation state-idea is not as sacred as people may be inclined to think.¹⁾ It is rather hypocritical for people in the Western World to be very strongly in favour of universal human rights but to protect the inviolability of their sovereignty and their (short-term) national self-interest with equal strength and with little concern for the desperate and deteriorating situation in Third World and especially in Africa.

Secondly, people from Western European countries will have to get more directly involved in the development and rescue

1) Just as the Ancien Regime gave way to a system of Middle Class Democracy at the turn of the 19th century, and it in its turn gave way to the system of Peoples Democracy at the beginning of this century, so in due time the idea of sovereign nation states - of which some are rich and others are very poor - will have to give way to one or other form of a New International Economic and Political Order.

projects in African countries. Hundreds and thousands of teachers, engineers, doctors, nurses, administrative personnel, etc., will have to work for long periods in different forms of "peace corps"-operations. If this involvement is going to be regarded as a disguised form of cultural imperialism, it will be a pity because Africa cannot be rescued without it. Western Europe (and the rest of the Western World) will have to recolonize Africa in one way or another, sooner than most people realize. For this reason, people in the Western World must get rid of their hang-ups about the so-called ugliness of colonialism.

Thirdly, strangely enough, Western European people, especially those with the necessary empathy for the people and the sorry plight of Africa, will have to assist Africa in attempts to conceptualize a development idea and a development strategy that will be functional in the Africa situation.

Finally, attempts to rescue the dying Southern part of the Middle Hemisphere can only succeed if the potential of South Africa (as an integral part of the Southern part of the Hemisphere) is used to a far greater extent than is the case at present. Any large-scale attempts to rescue Africa without the strategic contribution South Africa can make, is doomed to fail. As a Northern orientated country in the far South of the "Middle Hemisphere", the North must regard South Africa as a kind of gateway or bridge-head that will not only make it possible, but also easier, to rescue at least the Southern part of the great Southern half of the Middle Hemisphere. The Whites and the Coloureds in South Africa are in the unique position that they are some of the few people in the world that are European and African at the same time. They are standing - so to speak - with one foot in Europe and the other in Africa. Given their experience and especially their conceptualisation of the African scene and their knowledge of and their interest in Africa, they are in the key position to make an invaluable contribution to bridge the conceptual, the income and the development gaps between Western Europe and Africa.

E. SOUTH AFRICA'S ACTUAL AND POTENTIAL ROLE IN THE SUB-CONTINENT

Relative to the rest of Africa, long term economic development in South Africa can be regarded as relatively healthy. In approximately four decades since the Second World War the average growth rate of the per capita GNP was almost 2 per cent. If we take our relatively high population growth rate into account, this compares quite favourably with the situation in the Western European countries. (They maintain an average per capita growth rate of about 3 per cent per year.) In South Africa income is also divided rather unequally. A slow process to close the gaps is underway but at too slow a pace.¹⁾

The positive role South Africa is already playing in the development of many African countries is well-known. I mention but a few:

- South Africa is the most developed, modernised and industrialised country in Africa and one that is well-acquainted with technical and development problems which are unique to Africa. In this capacity South Africa can supply - and indeed is supplying many African States with valuable (and in many cases to them indispensable)- technical, medical, educational and other forms of aid and advice.
- South Africa creates job opportunities for thousands of job-seekers from her neighbouring countries.
- Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland (the so-called BLS countries) and other independent states (like Zimbabwe and Malawi) are economically and financially very dependent on South Africa. The governments of the BLS countries obtain an average of more than 60 per cent of government income from the Customs Union with South Africa. This Customs Union to a high degree favours the BLS countries.
- The importance of the South African transport and harbour facilities to several countries in Southern Africa - including Mozambique and Zimbabwe - is a well-acknowledged fact.

1) If we put the average household income of the different population groups in 1971 at an index value of 100, the index values in 1980 were: Whites 147, Coloureds 162, Asians 158, and Blacks 186. If we put the 1980 average household income of Whites at 100, then the income of Coloureds are 38, Indians 55 and Blacks (urban and homeland) 15.

- South Africa is a regional power with political, military and economic stability and as such is a stronghold in a sea (i.e. a Continent) of political and economic instability and uncertainty. (The indirect value of South Africa's stability and prosperity to countries in Southern Africa is normally not appreciated in Western Europe. I think it must be blamed on the very negative image that has been created of South Africa and its so-called Apartheid Policy.)
- The importance of South Africa for Western Europe (and the rest of the Western World) is normally stated in terms of three factors, namely the South African mineral resources, the Cape sea route and the beneficial and lucrative trade and investment possibilities. I want to add a fourth - and to my mind a more important - factor, namely the strategic value of a growing modern sector in South Africa for the development process of our neighbouring countries and on the whole African sub-continent.

The best way to appreciate the role South Africa is playing in the development of certain African countries is to imagine what will happen if the often predicted revolution or explosion did take place. This is an eventuality that - ... in the words of a previous Prime Minister ... "is too ghastly to contemplate". If a full-scale revolution did take place, it will in all probability escalate to a condition of complete chaos. Then not only South Africa, but the whole sub-continent will degenerate into one of the worst poverty-stricken regions in the world in which ethnic and hunger-wars will be rife. This will create, in due time, a burden of unthinkable dimensions for the Western World.

But let us be more positive. Although South Africa already plays a positive role in the development of many African countries, potentially she can play a much greater role. What is needed to fully mobilize South Africa's potential? Apart from the maintenance of law and order and a high growth rate, South Africa's potential as a catalyst of development in the sub-continent can only be fully realized if the process of internal political reform can be stepped up and better diplomatic relations created with the Black countries of

Southern Africa. The first is often regarded as a prerequisite for the second. Although this may be the case the necessary change in the attitude of African countries must not be under-estimated. The North (i.e. Western European countries) can play an important role to convince African states of the value of more friendly relations with South Africa. The African states must realise that in their present state of desperate poverty they can not allow themselves the luxury of all the high-sounding ideological rhetoric. A settlement of the South West Africa and Angolan problems (and the presence of Cubans in Angola) is of course a first and essential step towards better relations between South Africa and the Frontline States.

PART II

FUTURE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES FOR SOUTH AFRICA

A. THE NEED FOR STRUCTURAL REFORM

Let us turn to the South African microcosm. South Africa has become the polecat of the world because of the alleged racial discrimination and the legalized system of exploitation of the Black majority by a White minority. The relation between White and Black in South Africa is very complicated and it is not easy to prove the fact or the extent of Black exploitation. The world likes to believe that much wealth flows from the White to the Black world in South Africa. But it can easily be proved that much wealth also flows in the opposite direction. The world also likes to believe that on balance the relation between our White and the Black sectors is one of exploitation by the Whites - I have no intention to prove or to disprove these allegations. I only want to stress the possible structural similarities that may exist between the relation between the core and the periphery in the South African microcosm on the one hand and in the global macrocosm on the other hand. In the macrocosm the economic relations between the First World core and the Third World periphery are in many cases ones of neo-imperialistic exploitation. The operation of multinational companies cause in some cases (and perhaps in more cases than is generally realised) a flow of wealth from the Third World countries towards the First World. Since the start of the oil crisis the indebtedness of the Third World has increased from less than a \$100 billion to more than \$500 billion. With the sharp increase in interest rates this has put an extraordinary and seemingly unbearable burden on the Third World. Many Third World countries are now under obligations to use a much greater part of their GNP to service foreign loans.

The South African government has officially acknowledged on several occasions that the present political structure cannot be maintained. Apart from the intention to create a confederation of South African States, the government has recently announced constitutional plans to create a New Political Dispensation for Whites, Coloureds and Indians. There can be no doubt about the necessity of a fundamental restructuring of the South African political, social and economic system. We desperately need a New Dispensation in which the Black groups will have a part in decision-making and in which the net flow of wealth will in an increasing stream be from the White core to the Black periphery. At present the budget already brings about a flow (or a re-

distribution) of income from the Whites towards the Black groups. What is necessary is a gradual increase of this flow. With increasing amounts spent on, for example, Black education (with tax money paid mainly by Whites) it will be possible to create better opportunities and better capabilities for Blacks to earn higher incomes. In the long run this can bring about a meaningful re-distribution of income and wealth.

Much has already been written and spoken about the reform process in South Africa. The most common complaint is that too little is done too late. I am not going to dispute the truth of this statement. The political, social and economic reform that is needed, is in many cases already long overdue. If all the necessary and relevant reforms can be brought about, they will add up to a socio-economic structural change. But to do the things that ought to be done in proper time, will also necessitate a constitutional structural change. South Africa is caught in a typical "catch 22 situation". We need structural change - both as a result of reform and/or as a pre-condition for further reform. A lot of pressure for reform is building up, but at the same time the resistance within the present institutional structure is quite formidable and cannot be ignored if we want to maintain law and order and an evolutionary process. Fortunately, we have good reason to believe that the economic forces in favour of reform will in the longer run be much stronger than the social and political forces that want to maintain the status quo. And - what has become perhaps more important - we have reason to believe that the split in the ruling National Party will release dynamic forces that will bring about constitutional and other changes which looked rather impossible and unattainable at this time last year.

The real challenge facing South Africa is twofold:

Firstly, to set a process of constitutional change into motion that will create reasonable political and civic justice for the different Black groups by i.a. providing them with meaningful and adequate political bargaining power to enable them to improve their overall position in the dynamic South African scene - or, in what we hope will remain the dynamic South African scene.

Secondly, to maintain a high rate of economic growth and of Black development to increase the direct claim of the Black groups on the economy (via improved employment opportunities and capabilities) paralleled with the increase of their indirect claims on the economy (via the political processes).

It is, however, important that the structural changes on both levels will be of such a nature that civilized standards will not be endangered and the productive capacity of our economy not unduly be overstrained.

B. THE ROLE OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN ECONOMY IN THE PROCESS OF CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE

I have the strong impression that the close relationship and interdependence between the political and economic spheres - especially in a period of structural change in a developing country like South Africa - are normally not appreciated and respected to the necessary extent.

Looking at the process of political reform from the economic point of view there can be little doubt that the demands of the growing economy gave rise to one of the important - if not the most important - dynamic force responsible for the social and political reform which was brought about in say the last 20 years. It is a well-established fact that nothing had such a strong demolishing effect on many of the artificial walls

that were built as part and parcel of the Apartheid system, than the manpower needs of the growing economy. The pressures created by the growing economy also changed outmoded social patterns and undermined conservative ideas and thought patterns. Given that many of the reforms are painful, especially for certain White groups - because they had to make "sacrifices" in terms of vested interests and (protected) life patterns - experience proves that such changes can be brought about much more easily in a growing than in a stagnant economy. What happened in the labour and educational fields in the last few years was a direct result of the demands of the growing economy. The reforms in terms of the Riekert and Wiehahn reports were unthinkable without the shortage of skilled labour.

If South Africa wants to maintain a growth rate of 5 per cent in the next two decades the demand for skilled labour will be nearly insatiable. To maintain a 5 per cent growth rate will necessitate an educational revolution as far as blacks are concerned and an opening up of social and economic opportunities on an unprecedented scale. According to my colleague, Prof. J.L. Sadie, South Africa will need 400 000 persons in

executive positions in the year 2000 instead of the present 170 000, 1,5 million highly skilled workers instead of the present 500 000 and 1,6 million semi-skilled white-collar workers instead of the present 400 000.¹⁾

One does not need much of a fingertip feeling for economic relations to realize that it will not be possible to attain these manpower goals. But the pressure to attain as much as possible of them will be a very big and cumulating force for ongoing reforms.

But while a high economic growth rate was - and without any doubt will be - the strongest dynamic force to change the socio-political face of South Africa, we must on the other hand take note of the undisputable fact that the absolute size (and the total tax capacity) of the South African economy sets definite limits to the pace and the extent of constitutional reform. The history of Western Europe has demonstrated that the process of political (i.e. parliamentary) democratization is only the vehicle for a process of economic democratization. The broadening of the process of political representation in Parliament inevitably brought on its trail the broadening of welfare state expenditure by the central government.

Every decision on the pace and extent of constitutional reform in South Africa, must take into account that the reform will have public finance implications (on both the tax and the spending side of the budget). Such decisions will have to reckon with the fact that meaningful political reform (to provide additional bargaining power to Black groups) will put additional strain on the economy. Therefore such reform must happen at such a pace and be of such a nature that they will not overstrain or disrupt the South African economy.

1) If the most optimistic projection in connection with the training and promotion of Whites were attained in the next 20 years, then the annual needed addition of workers, other than Whites, will still be enormous. While only 300 non-Whites, were added annually to the executive category in the period 1959 - 1979, nearly 4 000 will have to be added annually in the next 20 years - 13 times more per annum. While only 8 000 highly skilled non-White workers were added annually to the labour force during the previous 20 years, nearly 50 000 will have to be added annually during the next 20 years - 6 times more per annum.

I do not want to be misunderstood on the issue of increased "welfare state" spendings on Blacks. On the one hand we need a comprehensive "Black Upliftment and Development" programme to improve the quality of life and the productive capacities of the Blacks. Without such a programme, it will be impossible to keep the wheels of the South African economy turning at the necessary pace. Higher spending on Blacks is also necessary to defuse some of the discontent and hostile attitudes in Black circles and to prepare the Black to play a greater, a more productive and responsible role in the South African economic and political systems of the future. But increasing welfare and educational spending on Blacks will not only put heavy burdens on the White tax payers, but also on their generosity. It is quite possible that the living standards of the Whites will have to be scaled down by 10 to 20 per cent (or even more) in the next decade or future - even if a growth rate of 5 per cent is maintained. The scaling down of living standards of a politically dominant group - and in South Africa's case also a very spoiled dominant group - on behalf of the socio-economic upliftment of the rest of the population (that in our case is also Black people) is not the easiest thing to accomplish - as every European ought to know. It is going to be very difficult especially if we take the strength of the White pressure groups and the attitudes of many Whites into account. But in the long run we will have no other choice but to scale down White living standards in the short and medium term to bring about the necessary Black upliftment and (hopefully) also general prosperity.

A fast-growing economy has proved to be one of the strongest forces to promote political reform in South Africa and this will also be the case in the future. But on the other hand both friend and foe must realize that the modern sector of the South African microcosm is relatively small when the total population of 28 million is taken into account and still in a vulnerable phase of development. Given the delicate balance between the rather high developed one quarter of South Africa's microcosm and the typical underdeveloped three-quarters of the microcosm, it is impossible to give everyone in South Africa the political rights and freedoms that were given to Western Europeans more or less at the beginning of this century at a time when these countries were more or less fully industrialized. It is also impossible

to use the Western World's parliamentary democracy as the political model on which to mould South Africa's future political system. Our challenge is not only to give meaningful political rights to Black groups but to give it to them in a political system which will be adapted to the unique characteristics of the South African microcosm. The real issues boils down to a very difficult trade-off between greater justice and opportunities for Black groups on the one hand and the maintenance of civilized standards, order and prosperity for all South Africans on the other hand. This trade-off is not a one-time exercise. It is going to be an ongoing challenge that may become more difficult in the years ahead.

To take the correct decisions in this trade-off will necessitate something of Solomon's wisdom. To my mind our political leaders will only succeed in continually making the correct trade-off if they are prepared to work with a rather longterm perspective in mind. The Whites in South Africa will have to be prepared to make quite considerable sacrifices in the short- and medium term and to regard it as a kind of investment for a more prosperous and just future for all South Africans in the long run. Given the power structures and attitudes in White circles this is easier said than done. We shall need a well-structured program to educate or to convince Whites to appreciate this longterm enlightened self-interest in more unambiguous terms than is the case at present. (In this educational task not only the educational institutions and the mass media will have to make constructive contributions, but the Afrikaans churches will have to play a leading role if we want to succeed. I must admit that the rightwing orientation of the churches creates quite a difficult problem). Luckily - as I will point out below - South Africa may at present have the kind of political leaders who are able and prepared to take the necessary longterm and enlightened perspectives in the difficult trade-offs they will have to make.

A study of the economic and political history of Europe furnishes undisputable evidence of the fact that the process of political democratization is a (historic) function of the process of industrial development and especially of the tax capacity of the relevant countries. At present South Africa does not have a democratic system. We only have a limited democracy - limited to the Whites. Given our stage of industrialization and given the tax capacity of our economy, this form of limited democracy is much too limited and not justifiable. The newly announced constitutional plans of the government to give

representation to Coloureds and Indians in two separate chambers in Parliament, is an attempt to broaden out system of limited democracy.

One reason why the government is - at least at this stage - not prepared to create a fourth chamber for the urban blacks can tentatively be attributed to a (perhaps unconscious) realization on the part of the government that in our present stage of economic and industrial development the creation of a Black chamber can easily overstrain the capacity of the economy. When putting it in these terms, I am not saying that a fourth chamber for urban Blacks will be created in ten or twenty years time. All I want to say, is that given the large numbers of the Blacks and given the economic capacity of the South African microcosm, the S.A. Government regards it as appropriate to provide political accommodation to Blacks, not within the framework of a parliamentary system, but within the framework of a Confederal structure.

It is impossible to envisage the capacity of our economy in 20 years time. Perhaps the three-chambered form of parliament may prove to be so adapted to the needs of the pluralistic groups in South Africa that the Confederal structure will develop into a kind of multi-chambered Parliament. But I doubt it. If we take into account that the Blacks are divided in eight different ethnic groups and that preferably separate representation must be given to each group, it is more probable that the political accommodations of the Black groups will continuously be in a Confederal body or "State Generaal". In the long run the real political debate may be about the decision-making powers given to the State Generaal of the South African Confederation.

C. THE SPLIT IN THE NATIONAL PARTY AND THE UNLEASHING OF REFORMING POWERS

Until the beginning of this year reform orientated academics had put their hope mainly on the pressures created by a growing economy. The long overdue split in the National Party that at long last took place in February, may prove to be an event that over the long run is going to release reforming powers of unexpected dynamism. The split may enable the reform-orientated group in the government to bring about those constitutional changes they regarded (for quite a considerable period of time already) as necessary and even indispensable to stabilize the South African situation and to make head-way towards a more humane

and just society. In the six months since the split the government has already given evidence of so much determinism to succeed with its reform program, that I have reason to talk about a New National Party - not because it has accepted a new policy, but because of its commitment to make a success of its program of constitutional reform. This New National Party government will to my mind need more or less 5 years to prove to the world that its reforms are not cosmetic - as the opposition parties to its left claims - but are real and substantial and that the cumulative effect of the reform will in all probability add up to a structural change.

To understand the true dimensions of the split in February, it is important to realise that the National Party up till then was not a normal political party but a cultural and ethnic clan. The National Party was originally a pure Afrikaner party. It was created in 1914 as a vehicle to mobilise Afrikaner support in the long struggle against British imperialism and British Capitalism in South Africa. After the Anglo-Boer War the Afrikaners were a defeated, poor, relatively uneducated and culturally underdeveloped White group in South Africa. They were true underdogs and strangers in their own country. To maintain themselves against the economical and cultural superiority and against the subtle discrimination of the English speaking South Africans was a formidable task. To mobilize the necessary political power it was necessary to activate all spheres of Afrikaner life. In this process the Afrikaner churches, schools, cultural organisations, economic and political organisations were all activated on behalf of the "Afrikaner cause". Afrikaner nationalism was eventually consolidated into a strong and united force.

The elite group in the English Establishment in South Africa is up till this day a typical extension of the Victorian Englishmen of the 19th century. They regard themselves not only as culturally and educationally better equipped to govern, but also as morally better equipped to govern other people. When the Union of South Africa was founded in 1910 the superiority complex of the English speakers and the inferiority complex of the Afrikaners were brought together in the same political structure. Consequently the stage was set for a long and bitter battle for political and economic hegemony. The pauperisation of the Afrikaners in the twenties and thirties gave a new momentum to the struggle. As had also happened in other Third World countries the economic instability and the Great Depression had very severe and

devastating effects on South Africa. It forced thousands of small Afrikaner farmers to migrate to the cities in search for job opportunities. The difficulty with which many so-called Poor Whites adapted to the unknown job-opportunities in the mostly hostile and English-orientated cities increased the animosity between the two groups. Many Poor Whites found themselves in a sandwich situation: the unympathetic attitude and often discriminatory actions of the English speakers on top and the ever present danger of Coloured and Black competition for job-opportunities from below. It was in these circumstances that the already existing policy of discrimination towards the Blacks was extended and legalized.

If one looks at the impoverished position of the Afrikaner in the thirties, it becomes clear why the temperature of Afrikaner nationalism reached its high point in that decade. It also coincided with a re-awakening of Afrikaner cultural consciousness and with quite outstanding achievements in the Afrikaans literature. The symbolic Great Trek to commemorate the centenary of the northward trek of the Afrikaners also took place in the thirties. No wonder that some observers regard the thirties as the actual starting point of Afrikaner nationalism as a typical underdog phenomenon.

In 1948 the National Party, as a well consolidated Afrikaner clan, won the general election and it has governed the country since then. In the first 10 to 15 years after 1948 the relation between the English- and Afrikaans speakers were pretty bad. The English speakers (approximately 40 per cent of the Whites) were much richer, they controlled 85 per cent of the economy outside agriculture and the government sectors. Given their Victorian attitudes it was very hard for them to accept the fact of Afrikaner political dominance. The best proof of this is the near vendetta waged in mainly the fifties and sixties by the English speaking press against the National Party government and the Afrikaners. On the other hand the Afrikaners - after they successfully captured the political power in 1948 - were of the opinion that as the pioneers in South Africa they also ought to control and own a greater part of the economy. The stage was set for a head-on clash. A lot of time and energy was unfortunately consumed in the ensuing struggle.

South Africa was at that stage characterised as a "very very strange society". Perhaps it was an apt description. The Victorian orientated

English Establishment were to a certain extent an anachronism with one foot so to speak still in the 19th century. The Afrikaner Establishment with its very strong inwardlooking Afrikaner nationalism was also a kind of anachronism with one foot in (a different part) of the 19th century. (Unfortunately this anachronistic tendency of the two White Establishments is still - perhaps to a lesser extent - operational today. The kind of solutions the world expects us to find for the problems in the South African microcosm are actually solutions for typical problems the world (as macrocosm) will have to solve in the 21st century. Given that the two White groups have still one foot each in the 19th century, the jump towards the 21st century that is expected from us, is going to be very difficult. Perhaps the soul searching with which Enlightened Afrikaners are busy after the split in the N.P., will enable them to arrive in the last quarter of the 20th century and to face the realities and the challenges of the day with open and receptive minds).

In the fifties the controversy on the Coloured franchise rights was the real battle ground between the two white groups. Unfortunately the Coloureds were in the end the real victims of this battle. Because they were at that stage in a position to determine which one of the White groups would govern the country, their representation in Parliament was abolished by the National Party government in 1956.

When South Africa became a Republic in 1961 another important bone of contention between the two White groups was removed. Since then the relationship between the two groups has improved remarkably. In the meantime economic progress produced a stronger group of Afrikaner businessmen with close relationships with the English business world. More or less in the middle of the sixties economic progress and government assistance succeeded in solving the Poor White problem. At about 1970 many of the reasons for the close ethnic consolidation of the Afrikaner clan and the use of it for political purposes were no longer valid. Unfortunately the grip of the Afrikaner clan on the National Party was maintained during the prime-ministerhip of Mr. John Vorster and often used to foster the sectional interest of the Afrikaners - in many cases to the detriment of other population groups. This was a very sad and unnecessary phase in the history of Afrikaner nationalism. While the Afrikaners were true underdogs it was appropriate for them to think, to organize and to act like underdogs. In the sixties and seventies they became upperdogs but unfortunately they continued to think, to organize and to

the National Party lost support in the 1981 election can be regarded as a direct result of these mounting tensions in Afrikaner circles.

In the 1981 election the popular support of the PFP increased to 19 per cent, and that of the NRP declined to 8 per cent. The combined support of the English-orientated parties dropped from 29 to 27 per cent. On the other side of the spectrum the support of the small rightwing party (the HNP) increased to 15 per cent. The support of the National Party dropped from 66 to 58 per cent. If we assume that the support for the Enlightened and Middle groups remains at about 22 per cent each, then the support of the Rightwing group within the party was more or less 14 per cent. (This division is made on the assumption that a part of the Rightwing group moved towards the Rightwing party before the election.)

In the second half of 1981 the polarisation between the Enlightened group and the Rightwing group - and between Mr. Botha and Dr. Treurnicht - became very severe. It was at that stage already clear that the recommendations of the President's Council (that were expected at the middle of this year) on Coloured and Indian representation in Parliament - or the "power-sharing" issue - would trigger off a split. When the split actually was triggered off in February 1982 by the "power-sharing" issue, Mr. Botha was successful in consolidating the Enlightened group and the Middle group into a well integrated party with a united and strong orientation towards reform. It is this party which I like to call the New National Party - a party that is no longer an Afrikaner clan.

With the split in the party the cultural and ethnic unity of Afrikaner clan was also shattered. After the split things can never be the same in South Africa. The split will hopefully turn out to be a happening of extraordinary historical importance. It hopefully spells the end of the era of artificial and underdog politics and the start of the normalization of political alliances in South Africa. It hopefully means the end of the joint membership of people that were ideologically poles apart but forced together in the same party for no other reason than the fact that their mother tongue was Afrikaans. It hopefully

will open the possibility for a close party alliance between all English- and Afrikaans-speakers who share common convictions and common ideals about a more humane and just society in South Africa. And hopefully it will also open possibilities for the creation of new relations and new alliances between Whites, Coloureds and Blacks.


At the moment a lot of speculation is taking place about the relative strength of the different parties. If a general election were to be held today it is quite possible that the combined support for the Conservative Party (C.P.) - that was founded by Dr. Treurnicht after the split - and the other rightwing party (H.N.P.) will be 30 per cent or even more. The combined support for the two English-orientated parties will in my judgement not be more than 25 per cent but in all probability less than 20 per cent. Up till now many English-speakers voted for the PFP as a so-called "effective opposition". English-speakers now start to realise that the whole idea of an effective opposition is a wrong concept in our kind of democracy. Because the PFP does not try to be an alternative government it has failed dismally not only in formulating an alternative policy but especially in costing the economic or public finance implications of the constitutional reforms they sometimes propagate. Many English-speakers voted in the past against the NP because it was an Afrikaner clan and because they could not associate themselves with the ideas of Dr. Treurnicht and the Rightwing group. The New National Party can without any doubt (if not immediately then in the near future) reckon on quite considerable support from English-speakers - especially if the reform plans of the government bring about meaningful constitutional changes. I am convinced that the NP will be supported by between 45 and 50 per cent of the popular vote if an election is held today or in the near future. With this kind of support the National Party can win at least 100 of the 165 seats in a general election with the rest of the seats divided equally between the English-orientated and the Rightwing parties. With this kind of support the government can proceed without too many problems to implement its constitutional proposals.

Although the Labour Party - the biggest Coloured Party - has not

act like underdogs. The real difference between the Enlightened and Rightwing groups in Afrikaner circles can be reduced to a difference in attitude on the role of the Afrikaners in South Africa. While the Rightwingers expect of the government to act as if the Afrikaners are still underdogs, the Enlightened wing regards it as totally unjustifiable and tries (with great risk for themselves) to dismantle the structure of unnecessary Afrikaner protection and privileges.

During the prime-ministership of Mr. Vorster the National Party started to "disintegrate" internally to become a kind of coalition party - actually a coalition of three groups; namely an Enlightened (or Verligte) group, a Middle group and a Rightwing (or Verkrampste) group. The attempts of the Enlightened group to define a broader and more "outwardlooking" concept of Afrikaner nationalism were only partly successful in the sixties and seventies.

The power of the National Party as an Afrikaner clan reached its climax in the 1977-election when 66 per cent of the voters supported it and 135 of the 165 seats in Parliament was won by the Party. Since 1977 remarkable changes have taken place that open the possibility for dynamic change in the political scene. To understand the real meaning of these changes it is necessary to compare the results of the 1977 election with that of the 1981 election and with the present situation in Parliament.



In the 1977 election the Progressive Federal Party (PFP) - the leftwing party in the White South African spectrum - got 17 per cent of the popular vote, the New Republic Party (NRP) - also an English-orientated party - got 12 per cent and the two small rightwing parties got 5 per cent. The exact support for the National Party is of course not known but for all practical purposes we can put it on 22 per cent for each group. At that stage the tensions between Enlightened and Rightwing groups were already quite severe. Mr. Vorster, however, succeeded in projecting a middle of the road image with sympathies towards both the Enlightened and the Rightwing groups. Although this kept the party united, the Enlightened group realised afterwards that they were at the losing end of Mr. Vorster's compromising strategies.

It is illuminating to compare the organisational power basis of the Rightwing group with that of the Enlightened group. The organisational power basis of the Rightwing was based on five "C's": the Caucus, the Cabinet, the (Afrikaner) Churches, the (Afrikaner) Cultural organisations and the Civil Service (or Bureaucracy). The organisational power basis of the Enlightened group was based on the Afrikaner Press, the Afrikaner business world and professional and younger people. While the organisational power basis of the Rightwing was very well organised and closely interwoven, the power basis of the Enlightened group was rather poorly organised and only loosely interrelated.

The power basis of the Rightwing was like a stone wall. In 1977 there were good reasons to believe that it would never be possible to break its grip on the National Party. But with the Information Scandal of 1978 the stone wall started to crumble. After Mr. Vorster's resignation as Prime Minister in 1978 the leader of the Enlightened group, Mr. P.W. Botha, was elected as Prime Minister. Looking back, it is now clear that the Information scandal created an unexpected opportunity for the Enlightened group to get control over the Caucus and the Cabinet and to break the close interrelationship between the five elements on which the power of the Rightwing was based. Since Mr. Botha became Prime Minister the tensions within the ranks of the Afrikaner organisations have mounted. The fact that

decided on their stand towards the new constitutional proposals, there are positive indications that they (and also the Indians) will support it. They are of course not satisfied with the proposals but they realise that this is perhaps the last chance for evolutionary and peaceful constitutional reform. They also realise that if this initiative of the government fails, Dr. Treurnicht stands a very good chance of becoming Prime Minister - and this scares them.

Dr. D.A.S. Herbst, director of the South African foundation, described the implications of the constitutional proposals as follows:

"Prime Minister P.W. Botha has launched South Africa on the road to an entirely new system of government which will finally dismantle the existing Westminster parliamentary system

The package of reforms presented by Mr. Botha contains all the elements to place South Africa democratically and through processes of negotiation and communication on a new road.

The package implies a new political style and demands changed attitudes from all concerned. The advent of a new political style implies that consensus or bridge building should replace conflict and paternalism, which have dominated the political scene for so many years.

Changed attitudes imply that those who cling to the privileges of the existing order will have to be persuaded that South Africa has to move beyond the idea of an exclusive white South Africa. Such a South Africa no longer exists and cannot be realized in future; a dynamic era of group alliance is unfolding.

A successful solving of the constitutional issue regarding Coloured and Asian political rights is inextricably linked to the question of black political rights. It is therefore expected that the latter issue will also be tackled in a more vigorous manner than in the past.

Finally, an outstanding advantage of the plan is that it can be phased in while the old system can be gradually dismantled. The country can still be effectively managed while a silent parliamentary revolution takes place.

Said the Sunday Times (August 1, 1982): So far reaching are his (Mr. Botha's) plans - unquestionably the most radical revision of South Africa's system of government this century - that proper analysis of their implications must await detailed study."¹⁾

The whole pattern of White politics has undergone rather fundamental changes in the last five years. Because of this, the government will have to become accustomed to a much more

uncertain and unpredictable political situation as was the case in the last two decades. A lot of the present uncertainty can be attributed to the fact that the split in the NP has not yet had all its ramifications on the different levels of the Afrikaner community. Because of this the government must prepare itself for very stormy weather. It may turn out that my scenario about the relative support for the different parties are too optimistic as far as the NP is concerned. But I am convinced that enough people will realise how much is at stake and will support the government in its reform efforts even if it demands rather big sacrifices. The important thing is that the government has at long last got rid of the "fetters" of the Rightwingers and of the grip of the Afrikaner clan and its narrow and inwardlooking nationalism. I am looking forward to a very exciting political phase in the South African history in the next decade or two. The justifiable pessimism of five years ago has been replaced by a new optimism about the future.

But if the future brings with it new and unexpected storms it is imperative and in the interests of the whole of Southern Africa that the government should be successful in weathering the storms. Nearly five hundred years ago the Portuguese considered calling the southern part of the Continent The Cape of Storms. They decided wisely to call it The Cape of Good Hope. Perhaps the issue on what kind of Cape it actually is, is not yet settled. It is however important, not only for South Africa and the Western World, but also for Africa that it turn out to be a real Cape of Good Hope!

1) Position Paper, SAF. Vol. 5, No. 15, 1982.