

**A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF  
SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONDITIONS FACED BY  
MIGRANTS  
FROM NAMAKWA AND THE KAROO IN THE  
WESTERN CAPE**

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# 1. INTRODUCTION

*“How do geese know when to fly into the sun? Who tells them the seasons? How do we, as humans know when it is time to move on? As with the migrant birds, so surely with us, there is a voice within if only we would listen to it, that tells us certainly when to go forth into the unknown.”*

*Elizabeth Kubler-Ross, Swiss-American psychiatrist and author.*

Migration is the subject of renewed focus in South African research and policy circles as fears of its destabilising consequences on provincial economic and spatial planning are re-ignited. Population movement can impact heavily on housing, education, food security, public health, public order and institutional development with potentially dire consequences for both the immigrant and native population. The potential magnitude of the destabilisation effect has prompted some researchers (Cross and Omoluabi, 2006; Weeks, 1996) to suggest that of the three demographic processes (fertility, migration, mortality), migration could have the greatest short-term impact on society. The societal impact of migration is explained by Weeks (1996: 229):

*“Although the consequences of migration for the individual are of considerable interest (especially to the one uprooted), a more pervasive aspect of the social consequences of migration is the impact on the demographic composition and social structure of both the donor and host areas. The demographic composition is influenced by the selective nature of migration, particularly the selectivity by age. The donor area typically loses people from its young adult population, those people then being added to the host area. The host area has its level of natural (resources) increase at the expense of the donor area.”*

Cross (2006: 205) argues that the very vision of a successful socio-demographic transition is at stake – in order for migrants to escape poverty, cities need to provide in-migrants with the foundations and tools they require to be successful by helping them enter the job market, provide quality education to their children and invest in their futures.

This paper will investigate the conditions faced by migrants in their province of destination and whether their welfare is enhanced by the decision to migrate. Non-migrants from

Namakwa and the Karoo, two district councils in the Northern Cape, as well as migrants from these district councils to the Western Cape will be studied, with the intention of revealing the extent of differences in conditions for these groups. The paper is organised as follows: a literature review of previous South African migration studies to provide context for the analysis, followed by a brief introduction to the geographical areas under consideration. A comparative analysis of non-migrants and migrants is conducted, ending with some general conclusions based on the findings.

## **2. THE SOUTH AFRICAN MIGRANT: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE**

Southern African migration patterns have been identified as one of the most well-researched and documented phenomena in the latter three decades of the twentieth century (Crush, 2000: 13). The 1970s and 1980s saw research across many disciplines focused on labour migration, while the 1990s witnessed a shift to concerns with immigration and human capital flight. The reason for this shift in focus was the removal of institutional barriers to permanent settlement in urban areas for people of colour (in particular Black South Africans) and the possible “brain drain” as a result of higher local crime rates and better employment and earnings prospects abroad.

After the abolition of influx control in 1986, two more significant factors emerged that could possibly affect the movement of people and their relationship with their household of origin negatively: the proliferation of HIV amongst young adults and high and increasing levels of unemployment (Posel and Casale, 2003: 1). The fundamental shifts in the intensity of these and other variables which are traditionally used to describe the migration decision make the re-evaluation of migration processes imperative and highly pertinent in the developing country context. This section of the literature review will briefly discuss the history of migration in South Africa, broad trends in recent years and a tentative profile of the modern South African migrant.

### **2.1 A brief history of migrant labour in South Africa**

Migration, and in particular oscillating migration, became firmly entrenched in South African society since the 1870s. The abolition of slavery in the 1830s led to perennial shortages of cheap labour, which in previous years had been alleviated through slaves being imported from distant locations (Wilson, 1972: 1). At the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> Century, agents were sent to Mozambique, Ciskei, Transkei and South West Africa to bring labour back to the Cape Colony to work in the vineyards and wheat-fields. Most men were brought to the Cape on a contract basis, but many of them decided to stay in the Cape after the expiry of their contracts.

In Natal, White settlers were also faced with labour shortages on expanding sugar plantations. They turned to labour from India in the 1860s, who were initially hired as contract labour. Eventually these migrant labourers were allowed to bring their families with them, with many of them settling outside of the farms where they initially worked (Wilson, 1972: 2).

The discovery of diamonds near Hopetown in 1866 signalled the beginning of large-scale labour migration to what is today known as the Northern Cape. Kimberley employed 10 000 Blacks (Wilson, 1972: 2) by 1874 and closed compounds had evolved to house workers and to effectively bar them from contact with the outside world. The discovery of gold in the Witwatersrand in 1886 also set the stage for rapid economic development and imminent shortages of labour in gold mines. By 1899, gold mines employed more than 100 000 Blacks, many of them migrant labourers. The system where men would leave their families for several months at a time to work on the mines prevails to this day, although under less coercive circumstances.

By 1923 the South African government introduced the Native (Urban Areas) Act of 1923 to recognise property rights of Blacks in urban areas. Black people were relegated to locations, which were separate areas set aside for their occupation. The Act was instrumental in influx control in that it allowed local authorities to deport those Black people who were 'habitually unemployed' (Wentzel and Tlabela, 2006: 85). In 1937 the Native Law Amendment Act set the machinery in place for systematic influx control. Urban authorities were required to keep records of Black people living in their respective areas and if population numbers exceeded labour requirements, the Minister of Native Affairs could deport the excess numbers.

African mobility was restricted through pass laws since the 1920s, which initially required Black men to carry passes to work in certain areas. The Holloway Commission of 1932 recommended that pass laws be abolished, but by the 1950s influx control had intensified and the pass laws had been extended to include Black women as well (Wentzel and Tlabela, 2006: 87). In 1950 the Group Areas Act was passed, which prevented people of different races living in the same areas. This meant the relocation of people of colour to townships and locations and the footprint of forced removal is still evident in South African society today.

The success of the influx control system measures instituted by the apartheid government was illustrated by the relatively low urbanization levels of Black people in South Africa.

According to the 1980 Census 81% of Whites, 91% of Coloured, 77% of Indians and only 33% of Blacks resided in urban and metropolitan areas (Simkins, 1983: 119). However, by the 1970s imminent skills and labour shortages meant a need for Black urbanisation. African townships sprang up near urban centres to accommodate demand for labour. By the 1980s demand for labour had slowed down considerably as a result of moves towards more capital-intensive production and sanctions against South Africa. Those Black work-seekers who lived near urban areas were favoured for employment, with rural work-seekers effectively being excluded from urban labour markets. Their need to have access to urban areas therefore forced illegal squatting outside urban areas and many people living in township backyards and shacks erected on vacant land. This trend still continues today, testament to the lingering effects of segregationist policies.

## **2.2 Migration trends in recent years**

Economic and political transitions have generally been catalysts for increased internal migration in developing countries in Latin America, Asia and Africa (Gurmu et al, 2000). In this respect, South Africa is no different, with the abolition of influx control and in a broader sense apartheid, allowing more freedom of movement and settlement for South African people of colour. Although patterns of migration are largely unchanged when one looks at propensity for migration by race, there are slight differences in other variables such as the numbers of children who migrate.

The demise of apartheid not only eliminated the legal/formal restrictions on mobility and settlement, but also ushered in a new era of globalisation and a more competitive labour market with diminished absorption capacity. Van der Berg et al (2002: 33) assert that the rural labour market participant is likely to be the most vulnerable in urban labour market settings.

Census data also reveals marked decreases in return migration (Van der Berg et al, 2002), which are explained to some degree by the increased feminisation of migration as women joined their partners in their destination areas/provinces. However, the explanation for the decrease in return migration is perhaps not as simple as Census data would suggest. It is also possible that migrants have not yet reached the return migration point in their labour market “lifecycle”, and some researchers suggest that too little time has passed since democratisation

and the abolition of influx control for any conclusions to be made.

The improvement of road networks and access to public transport in recent years would lead one to expect that physical distance would gradually lose its importance as an explanatory variable in migration probabilities. Wentzel, Viljoen and Kok (2006: 184) analyse the characteristics of internal migrants in South Africa and find that the Free State and the Northern Cape generated the smallest proportions of migrants who moved to other provinces. A separate analysis of these provinces revealed that these provinces also had the highest rates of intra-provincial migration, which is almost certainly evident of the importance of distance in explaining these provinces' migrant characteristics.

Interestingly, the pattern of high intra-migration rates is similar in more affluent South African provinces. Oosthuizen and Naidoo (2004) employ the Census 2001 and LFS 2002 datasets generated by Statistics South Africa to describe and quantify migration to the Gauteng province. They find that of all recent migrants residing in Gauteng, almost 60% (slightly more than 1 million people) moved from elsewhere within the same province. More than four-fifths of these recent migrants were concentrated in metropolitan areas, with Johannesburg receiving approximately 39.5% of all intra-Gauteng migrants (Oosthuizen and Naidoo, 2004: 6). On the other hand, Tshwane (previously known as Pretoria) received more non-Gauteng residents (27.1%), a figure which becomes more noteworthy when one considers its relatively small share of the entire population (17.3%). Oosthuizen and Naidoo attribute the differences to local residents perceiving Johannesburg as having had greater job opportunities and Tshwane having received civil servants from outside of the province.

Physical distance is also a proxy for the psychological costs of moving, and therefore some caution should be exercised when interpreting the results. The unwillingness to migrate far from the household of origin could indicate a preference for a natural resource base or insurance policy against labour market insecurity or ill health (Wilkinson et al, 1998). The household of origin provides refuge in times of ill-health and labour market insecurity. Although the inclusion of physical distance in modelling migration probabilities is a tempting proposition, the difficulty of obtaining reliable, consistent estimates of distance between areas makes the inclusion of this variable in regressions a difficult exercise. Thus, one can only infer, rather than unequivocally state, that distance is related to the rate of internal migration. The role of imperfect housing markets in the restrictive costs of rent in urban, extra-regional

areas could also explain the low mobility of rural migrants. Andrienko and Guriev (2004: 9) postulate that the lack of access to mortgages invariably pushes up rent in urban markets, making it one of the prime considerations when making the migration decision. In an earlier paper Friebel and Guriev (2002) question the ability of potential migrants to afford rent in urban areas as their rural wages barely exceed subsistence levels. In the South African context, employed and potentially employed migrants have responded to unaffordable rentals by creating informal settlements on the urban fringe. Settlement here and the subsequent initial inclusion of these settlements in more affluent demarcation zones make the targeting of areas for poverty alleviation or access to services difficult.

Van der Berg et al (2002: 33) stress the impact of HIV/AIDS on migration and spatial planning. They note that HIV/AIDS has thrown the demographics of provinces such as the Eastern Cape into disarray with huge consequences for the planning of service provision. To quantify the impact of HIV/AIDS on migration probabilities will always be an imperfect exercise as one has to rely on self-reporting for infection rates (Roux and van Tonder, 2006). De Villiers (2000: 6) asserts that the more pronounced HIV infection rates of the most productive (and more migratory) segment of the labour market (25 to 39 years old) are bound to affect migration probabilities profoundly in years to come and will hopefully inspire more research into the relationship between health status and migration.

The environment shaping the migration decision has changed dramatically since the transition to democracy in South Africa. The rising unemployment levels, financial constraints, the removal of institutional barriers and the impact of HIV have all had significant effects on the probabilities of migration and the outcomes thereof. Although the former two factors have generally received attention from migration analysts, the effects of the latter two are considerable enough to prompt better data generation and management at national level in future.

### **2.3 Characteristics of South African migrants**

Certain groups of people are more inclined to migrate than others (Britz, 2002: 35). It is tempting to infer from higher migration rates of economically active individuals from the former homelands that migration is a predominantly rural-urban movement of Black males. However, this sort of inference is superficial and does not do justice to the variety of migrants

in contemporary South Africa. The typical variables included in migration analysis are race, age, gender, marital status, household composition, educational attainment and employment status. These demographic variables are admittedly narrow in their focus, but suffice to form a robust framework which can be bolstered by “softer” factors such as attitudinal data. Although work by Kok et al (2006) has included “soft” analysis as well, this review will not attempt to do the same. However, the relationship of the migrant to the sending household and the social network in the area of destination will be discussed in deference to the importance of sociological variables in explaining migration patterns in South Africa.

### **2.3.1 Race**

Traditionally South African migration, in particular labour migration, has been a largely Black and White phenomenon. The importance of race as a descriptive variable for migrant characteristics has its root in legal measures adopted during Apartheid to prevent Black people from settling permanently in towns where they worked. Influx control significantly skewed migration probabilities in that by and large Black dependents were immobile and had to depend on remittances and self-sufficiency for survival. The abolition of influx control in 1986 and the advent of democracy in 1994 led to a priori expectations that oscillating labour migration would eventually give way to more permanent migration and that settlement patterns by race would change. Thus, while research in the 1970s and 1980s was focused on oscillating labour migration patterns, the latter half of the 1990s attempted to determine whether settlement of migrants in urban areas had occurred and what conditions they faced at their destination.

In Oosthuizen and Naidoo’s (2004) investigation of the role of race in migration patterns to Gauteng, they find that just more than three-quarters of in-migrants to Gauteng were Black, just less than one-fifth were White and the remaining 5% of in-migrants consisted of Coloureds and Asians. In general, Johannesburg attracts the largest proportion of in-migrants, but a desegregation of destinations by race is slightly more revealing (Oosthuizen and Naidoo, 2004: 9). Migrant settlement by race varies radically among districts, with the racial composition of migrants in the West Rand and Metsweding (made up of Kungwini and Bronkhorstspuit municipalities) being 80% Black, 18% White and 2% Coloured and Asian. The majority of White in-migrants are attracted to Sedibeng and Tshwane (45%), while Johannesburg is the prime destination for Blacks, Coloureds and Asians (Oosthuizen and Naidoo, 2004: 10).

### 2.3.2 Age

Age is a significant predictor of the ability and/ or proclivity to migrate. Typically one would compare age structures of residents born in a certain area to those residents born in other regions. White and Woods (1980: 14) explain the significance of age as a predictor of migration probabilities:

*“Age is of particular importance in explaining the likelihood of migration occurring. Customarily the propensity to migrate is greatest in the young-adult age groups, particularly between school-leaving age and the age of 30 in economically advanced societies. Such migration is generally associated with the search for a job, and with job-changes occurring at the lower rungs of the ladder. After the age of 30, migration is generally reduced and residential stability becomes the norm. At the ages of 60 to 65 a further peak of migration may occur involving a change of residence at retirement.”*

This statement is borne out by Oosthuizen and Naidoo (2004: 11). They compare the age structure of residents born in Gauteng to those born in the other South African provinces. They find that the proportion of Gauteng-born residents of working age (as a proportion of the entire Gauteng-born population) is significantly lower at 65.5% than the 81.8 % of those individuals born outside of Gauteng who are of working age.

Besides physical age-related factors such as health and employment selectivity, young people are also socialised so that greater mobility is possible for them. They are not as intimately bound with their environments as older people are, and are generally more prepared mentally for migration (Britz, 2002: 36). Their relative lack of assets and social capital makes the decisions to uproot much easier.

Van der Berg et al (2002) investigate the changing rural-urban interface as a result of migration, using data from Census 1996 and the 1995 October Household Survey. Their methodology involves only regarding the moves in the first nine months of 1996 to get more accurate estimates of in-and-out-migration. In their analysis of migration from Transkei to the Western Cape, they find that “migration is highly age-selective” (Van der Berg et al, 2002:7). Young adults (26 to 35 years old) and youths (16 to 25 years old) are more likely to migrate than younger and older people. They also find that younger children (younger than six years

old) are more likely to migrate than the above-mentioned youths, suggesting that parents are more likely to migrate with younger children, or because younger couples with younger children are more likely to migrate.

The impact of children and assets seem to indicate that age is a proxy, rather than a directly associated variable, for stages in the individual's life. White and Woods (1980: 14) suggest that life-cycle stages, rather than age, are more directly correlated with migration selectivity. It is possible that age is just a proxy for variables associated with a life-cycle stage, and that relative uniformity within or across population groups may account for the strong association with age.

### **2.3.3 Gender**


South Africa's migration patterns have been largely gender-biased since the 19<sup>th</sup> Century. Males have typically migrated to fill labour-intensive positions in the mining regions in the northern parts of South Africa. The gender divide in waged work was exacerbated by the "internal structures of control" (Posel, 2003: 2) which upheld the traditional division of labour into household production functions for females and waged, often migrant, work for males. Male migration was symptomatic of the real or perceived comparative wage advantages that males had over females in waged work.

Using Census data, Kok et al (2003: 55) investigate South African<sup>1</sup> migration patterns for the periods 1975 – 80 and 1992 – 96 and find that gender as well as age is significant explanatory variables. Their results, illustrated in figures 1 and 2 overleaf, show clear patterns of male-dominated migration with migration in both groups peaking at 25 to 29 years old.

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<sup>1</sup> The Census data for 1980 excludes the migration of residents from the former homelands of Transkei, Bophuthatswana and Venda.


**Figure 1. Migration rates by age group for the period 1975 – 80 based on Census 1980 data.**



Source: Kok et al (2003: 56).

Note: people in the former homelands were not included in Census 1980.

**Figure 2. Migration rates by age group for the period 1992 – 96 based on Census 1996**



Source: Kok et al (2003: 56).

Oosthuizen and Naidoo (2004) investigate the male-female ratio of Gauteng residents born in Gauteng and those born outside. The former is 94:100, while the latter has a 107:100 ratio, a strong indication of the gender-bias in South African migration (Oosthuizen and Naidoo,

2004: 11). However, figures 1 and 2 show clearly how the gender gap in terms of migration had narrowed in less than two decades.

The treatment of rural households as a unitary decision-making unit was challenged by feminist historians such as Bozzoli (1983) and Walker (1990). The implicit assumption of previous research papers was that the rural household was a “harmonious unit” in which all its members maximised household resources in a united fashion. However, the unitary household model could simply have been indicative of a controlling male-headed household supported by patriarchal community structures. It is possible that, to maximise their own income, men selected themselves as migrants rather than remaining behind to receive a share of remittance (Posel, 2003: 3). The implicit inference is that selfish economic motivation<sup>2</sup> could possibly be the driver of male rather than female migration.

The employment vulnerability of women, notably in African rural communities, is evidenced by the rise in unemployment of women relative to men. Posel and Casale (2003: 7) investigate changes in the migration patterns of women in South Africa using OHS data and find that broad unemployment amongst women had risen from 38 percent to 47 percent from 1995 to 1999 compared to 23 percent and 32 percent for males. Thus, relatively lower employment probabilities for female rural migrants in urban areas and the social cost of being a newcomer could act as deterrents for female migration (Van der Berg et al, 2002).

Van der Berg et al (2002: 14) find that although female migration rates from Transkei and Limpopo to metropolitan areas in the Western Cape and Gauteng are lower than those for males, this difference is not as large as under apartheid. This finding supports the argument that the abolition of influx control and the changing gender status quo as a result of fragmented households (perpetuated by previous gender-biased migration patterns) has significantly altered migration patterns in South Africa.

Posel and Casale (2003: 9) suggest that a possible reason for increased female labour migration rates is that females could be joining their male partners. They illustrate this by estimating a female migrant regression equation using 1993 PSLSD data (Table A.1 in appendix of this document), and find that the probability of women being migrant workers is

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<sup>2</sup> For the dynamics of intra-household consumption in the selfish male-headed household, the reader is referred to “Sin taxes and poor households” (Black and Mohamed, 2006).

positively and significantly related to the presence of a male labour migrant.

The higher rates of divorce, death of the male head and the need to be less dependent on agriculture could also be precursors to migration for women. These added pressures force women to migrate to ensure the survival of their families (Adepoju, 2006: 37).

Raubenheimer (1987: 22) asserts that the gender composition of migrants is affected by economic, social and cultural factors that give one gender a comparative advantage over another in the destination area. White and Woods (1980: 15) note that gender may be an important factor to consider in migration selectivity, but it is not always biased in the same way and may also not affect probabilities of migration at all. However, as this section has shown, South African cultural and institutional barriers significantly affected migration possibilities by gender in the past. The low education levels of labour migrants in previous years could also have skewed migration selectivity in that more labour-intensive employment opportunities were concentrated in distant mining towns or heavy industry areas. Thus one would expect higher female migration rates after the abolition of influx control. The removal of institutional barriers in the latter half of the 1980s and the early 1990s and the relative relaxation of cultural barriers have altered post-apartheid gender-based migration patterns. The lower employment probabilities of female migrants could be explained by the perception that females are less able or inclined to do hard labour. Low education levels also prevent them from pursuing more skilled employment opportunities.

#### **2.3.4 Educational attainment, occupational status and employment levels**

The level of educational attainment generally enjoys a positive relationship with mobility, marketability and as a result better employment prospects in urban areas. In most countries, migrants with the most education migrate more readily from rural to urban areas. People with secondary and tertiary education levels are more likely to migrate than those with primary education levels, but this can partly be explained by the fact that rural sending areas often do not have the capacity to provide higher education, forcing the individual to migrate in pursuit thereof (White and Woods, 1980). Therefore, education acts as a dual incentive for migration: migration could occur because the migrant has higher education levels or simply wants to attain higher education levels.

With few exceptions in South Africa, low education rates are synonymous with high unemployment rates and rural areas. South Africa's more competitive stance in the global arena in the 1990s led to fundamental changes in the demand and supply of labour. Demand for unskilled and semi-skilled labour had waned considerably by the end of the 1990s (Kok et al, 2003: 53) which profoundly affected labour migration patterns and employment probabilities for labour migrants. The changing patterns affected those who were typically most vulnerable and ill-equipped to deal with change – the young, unemployed and poorly educated.

Van der Berg et al (2002: 21) find thresholds for educational attainment affecting probabilities of migration among black people from Transkei, a former TBVC area. Although secondary education increases the likelihood of migration for migrants from Transkei, migrants with tertiary education are less likely to migrate. Van der Berg et al (2002: 7) attribute this trend to the higher probabilities of migrants with tertiary education finding jobs as teachers and nurses in the Eastern Cape. Their findings, although contradictory to a priori expectations of monotonicity, suggest that more in-depth analysis of education and its relationship with migration is needed in the South African context.

Some occupational groups are more likely to migrate than others. Migration selectivity according to occupational group is illustrated in Table 1. Although nearly half of all respondents in the 2001- 02 HRSC Migration Survey were unskilled, the dominant occupational status categories for migrant workers were white-collar occupational categories.

**Table 1. Distribution of occupational status, by respondent group**

<b>Occupational status categories</b>	<b>Non-migrants (%)</b>	<b>Internal migrants (%)</b>	<b>All respondents (%)</b>
Managerial, executive, high admin and independent professional	7	7	7
Middle and lower level professional and inspectional	6	11	8
White collar, sales and clerical	11	10	11
Skilled manual and supervisory	6	9	7
Semi-skilled, operator, driver	15	12	13
Unskilled manual, labourer	45	44	45
Not answered, other	10	7	9
Total	100	100	100
Weighted Population	7 825 052	7 789 547	15 855 290

Source: Kok et al (2006: 186).

The 2001-02 HRSC survey revealed that South African internal migrants also seemed to have a higher rate of employment at 40% compared to their non-migratory counterparts at 30 % (Kok et al, 2006: 184). Their analysis, depicted in Table 2, shows that although the unemployment rates for migrants and non-migrants were similar at 27% and 31% respectively, the percentage of non-migrants who had never worked before was 48% compared to internal migrants at 29%.

**Table 2. Reasons for not working, by migrant category**

<b>Reasons for not working</b>	<b>Internal migrants (%)</b>	<b>Non-migrants (%)</b>
Never worked	48	29
Currently unemployed and looking for work	27	31
Currently unemployed and not looking for work	7	13
Housewife/ homemaker	3	5
Pupil/ full-time student	3	2
Retired person/ pensioner	6	9
Disabled (not able to work)	3	7

Source: Kok et al (2006: 185).

### 2.3.5 Marital status and household composition

Marital status and household composition are two important factors affecting both intra-household allocation and direct and indirect migration probabilities. Recent literature focuses on the effects of marital status and household composition on female migration probabilities. This was due to their enforced immobility in the past, either through cultural or institutional barriers. Posel and Casale (2003: 7) cite Todes (2001: 17-18) who stresses the importance of cultural barriers in explaining lower rates of migration for women:

*“It was rare for women to experience the freedom of movement that men did... Women’s mobility varied according to their position in the household. Women could not move at will – their husband’s power in this regard was clearly apparent. Unmarried women were freer to move, but this depended on their position and conditions within the household. They were frequently constrained by their roles as care-givers, responsibility for children, the sick and disabled, and for old parents.”*

If being subservient to men restricts the mobility of women, one can reasonably expect that being married would constrain female migration and being single would encourage female migration. For migrants to Gauteng, Oosthuizen and Naidoo (2003: 35) find that male and female migrant workers were significantly different in terms of marital status. More than half of male migrant workers were married or were living with a partner, in stark contrast to the one-fifth of female migrants who were married. The authors attribute this finding to the fact that most female migrants had never been married, or were divorced or widowed. Indeed, Oosthuizen and Naidoo (2003: 36) find that 66.4% of female migrant workers to Gauteng had never been married compared to 44.2 % of their male counterparts.

Posel and Casale (2003: 8) estimate a female “migration decision” equation using 1993 PSLSD data and find that women’s relationship with men profoundly affected their decision to migrate or not. Women who were married were less likely to migrate than their unmarried counterparts<sup>3</sup>. One expects that the traditional child-care role of women would impact negatively on the decision to migrate. The number of young children (6 years old and younger) in the household significantly reduced the probability of migration. As the number of older children (7 to 14 years old) increased in the household, the more likely it was that

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<sup>3</sup> Although the PSLSD survey does not ask direct questions about marriage, the authors infer from the absence or presence of the spousal member whether the respondent was unmarried. This could underestimate the proportion of married women. Also, it is not clear whether respondents would have reported having an unmarried partner as married or as having no spouse.

women would migrate. It is possible that the increasing costs of children as they start attending school compelled mothers to migrate and leave children in the care of grandmothers or other family (Posel and Casale, 2006: 10). The presence of pension-aged women was also positively related to female migration probabilities, highlighting the importance of grandmothers in childcare and income supplementation through pension grants.

Marital status and household composition are undoubtedly important predictors of migration probabilities. The decline in marital rates since the early 1990s and shifts in cultural attitudes for some women have altered migration patterns significantly. Decision-making power has gradually shifted in favour of females, prompting the increase in female migration rates in recent years. The ages and number of children also affect migration probabilities, as does the presence of pension-aged people in the household of origin<sup>4</sup>.

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<sup>4</sup> Klasen and Woolard (2000) found that the reluctance or inability of younger household members to set up new households is related in part to the incidence of old-age pensions in the household.

### **2.3.6 Relationship with the sending household: Remittances as investment returns and investment options**

The tradition of remittances is firmly rooted in the historical evolution of migration. Adepoju (1998) refers to the dual residential arrangement strategy that many migrants adopt to maximise returns from migration and to maintain their extended family structure in the event of ill-health or unfavourable employment probabilities. The strategy entailed one household member migrating alone, setting up cheap accommodation and working to pay off loans made to pay for migration. The selection and investment of the family in one or more household members' migration costs compelled the migrant to make regular remittances to support those left behind. In South Africa, the institutional barriers to migrants settling with their families in destination areas forced the adoption of a remittance system for the family's survival (Cross et al, 1998).

Migrant's remittances, sometimes the only link between the sending household and the migrant, support poorer and less able household and family members. Generally remittances were used for consumption, but in many cases were used for investment or paying for education or improving agricultural productivity (Kok et al, 2006: 31). In South Africa, remittance transfers received by rural Black households increased from 1993 to 1999, but by 2002 this proportion had decreased substantially (Posel and Casale, 2003: 354). The real value of remittances received by these households had started decreasing since 1993, suggesting that economic ties with sending households had become weaker over time.

Sharp (2001: 156) also identifies decreases in real wages and labour market insecurity as reasons for falling values of remittances. The improved coverage and increased values of social pensions may also contribute to this phenomenon due to perceptions that remittances are no longer so desperately needed. In the Limpopo Baber (1996: 293) found that new formal investment choices such as insurance policies and savings accounts crowded out direct investments in rural alternatives such as cultivation. The existence of other investment options may therefore compel the migrant to only send enough money to the household of origin for consumption. This has dire consequences for the household and as a result, for the planning of the social security system.

On the other hand, Todes (1998) suggests that economic ties based on agriculture and

livestock had been substituted by investment in housing, reflecting migrants' intentions to return to their rural sending area to retire. The desire to retire in the sending area was clearly illustrated by migrants over 50 years of age remitting significantly more than other age groups (Posel and Casale, 2003: 13), probably in anticipation of impending retirement. However, it is also possible that norms and values of remitting may be more entrenched in older migrants. The lower costs of living, real or perceived, in the rural sending area are cited by James (2001: 93), quoted by Posel and Casale (2003: 12), as the reason for the preference. Her assessment of the preference is thus: "Land represents a sense of security, identity and history, rather than being just an asset to be used for farming alone."

## **2.4 South African evidence: conclusion**

The study of migrant characteristics provides valuable insights into the perpetuation and creation of diversity by migration and settlement patterns. This section of the paper has briefly discussed the environment which shapes the migration decision as well as the characteristics of migrants. The profile of the South African migrant is important for spatial planning and policy formulation in anticipation of an influx or exodus of migrants, as well as measuring and understanding the economic impact thereof on sending and destination areas.

The following salient trends emerge from this literature review of South African migration:

- Migrants are generally younger and not as bound maritally or otherwise to their household of origin as their stationary counterparts.
- Blacks and Whites are more likely to migrate than Coloureds and Indians when one decomposes migration probabilities by race.
- Although men are more likely to migrate than women, there is a definite rise in the proportion of women who are migrants.
- Educational attainment and occupational status are positively related to migration probabilities, although economic opportunities in the area of origin or destination might not always translate into strictly linear relationships.
- Remittances are falling over time, indicating that either families are joining the migrant in the area of destination or that social norms have changed over time.

The implications of male-dominated migration and the decline in the importance of


agriculture in economic activity do not bode well for rural areas. The highly age-selective nature of migration means that rural areas send their most productive citizens to more urban areas, resulting in less advancement or educational opportunities for rural inhabitants. This is exacerbated by falling remittance values (possibly because of more extensive grant coverage) which only allow for basic consumption.

### 3. A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO THE NORTHERN CAPE

#### 3.1 Demographic profile

According to Census 2001, the Northern Cape is home to approximately 796 000 people. It is the largest South African province by area (361 830 km<sup>2</sup>), but is also the most sparsely populated.

**Figure 3. Northern Cape district councils map according to Census 2001**



The province is split into five district councils as shown in the map above. District councils in the Northern Cape are predominantly urban and the province itself is the third most urbanised province in South Africa (Table A.2).


**Table 3. The Northern Cape by area type**

	<b>Urban</b>	<b>Rural</b>
<b>Namakwa</b>	85.6%	14.4%
<b>Karoo</b>	81.6%	18.4%
<b>Siyanda</b>	79.2%	20.8%
<b>Frances Baard</b>	87.6%	12.4%
<b>Kgalagadi</b>	72.1%	27.9%
<b>Average NC</b>	83.3%	16.6%

The two district councils under consideration (Namakwa and the Karoo) border the Western


Cape at their southern points and together constitute approximately 32.54% of the province's total population (figure 4).

**Figure 4. Population by DC in the Northern Cape, Census 2001**



Namakwa and the Karoo are predominantly Coloured district councils (hereinafter referred to as DC's) with relatively few Blacks and even fewer Whites (figure 5). The Indian population is extremely small in both the DC's under consideration. The rest of the Northern Cape's DC's exhibit similar patterns by DC except for Frances Baard and Kgalagadi.

**Figure 5. Racial composition by DC in the Northern Cape, Census 2001**



The average household size in the Northern Cape is 3.8 members. Coloured households are largest with 4.24 members, followed by Black households with 3.74 members and Indian and White households with 3.28 and 2.74 members respectively (Table A.3).

The age structure of the Northern Cape is in line with the national average. The working age population constitutes 64.1% of the provincial population.

**Table 4. Age structure of the Northern Cape compared to other provinces**

	<b>0-14</b>	<b>15-64</b>	<b>65 and older</b>
<b>Western Cape</b>	27.2%	67.9%	4.9%
<b>Eastern Cape</b>	36.6%	57.6%	5.8%
<b>Northern Cape</b>	31%	64.1%	4.9%
<b>Free State</b>	30.8%	64.8%	4.5%
<b>KwaZulu Natal</b>	34.5%	61.3%	4.3%
<b>North West</b>	31%	64.5%	4.5%
<b>Gauteng</b>	23.1%	73.2%	3.7%
<b>Mpumalanga</b>	35.3%	61%	3.7%
<b>Limpopo</b>	39.5%	55.3%	5.2%
<b>Average South Africa</b>	31.9%	63.6%	4.6%

## 3.2 Poverty, education and unemployment

### 3.2.1 Poverty rates


The poverty line of R 322 per month or R 3864 per annum was chosen to calculate the poverty rates in each province. The Northern Cape has the third lowest level of poverty in South Africa. It has also has the third highest real income per capita.

**Table 5. Poverty rates by province (excluding zero income households)**

Western Cape	Eastern Cape	Northern Cape	Free State	KwaZulu Natal	North West	Gauteng	Mpumalanga	Limpopo
28.74%	68.92%	53.42%	62.7%	60.01%	58.5%	30.17%	62.26%	72.73%
<b>Real income per capita (excluding zero income households)</b>								
R 25 673	R 11 838	R 15 028	R 13 531	R 14 898	R 12 028	R 36 650	R 13 352	R 9 338

However, the Northern Cape has an extremely high Gini coefficient of 0.78. The differences in real per capita income by race illustrate the extent of inequality (figure 6).

**Figure 6. Real per capita income by race in the Northern Cape**



### 3.2.2 Education levels

The mean level of education<sup>5</sup> in the Northern Cape does not compare favourably with the national average. It has the fourth lowest mean years of education in the country. Almost 79% of its inhabitants have less than a Matric education (Table 6 overleaf).

<sup>5</sup> Only those individuals between the ages of 15 and 64 who reported themselves as not attending school were included.

**Table 6. Educational attainment by province**

	No education	Incomplete primary	Complete primary	Incomplete secondary	Matric	Matric + 1yr diploma	Matric + Degree	Mean years education
<b>Western Cape</b>	5.17%	15.32%	8.43%	38.28%	22.62%	6.07%	4.11%	9
<b>Eastern Cape</b>	21.65%	20.77%	8.12%	29.40%	14.05%	4.29%	1.71%	6.79
<b>Northern Cape</b>	16.89%	21.52%	9.16%	31.26%	15.97%	3.81%	1.39%	7.14
<b>Free State</b>	14.29%	21.62%	8.51%	31.54%	18.00%	4.30%	1.75%	7.37
<b>KwaZulu Natal</b>	21.35%	17.21%	6.24%	29.01%	19.75%	4.48%	1.97%	7.25
<b>North West</b>	18.83%	21.00%	7.48%	29.15%	18.17%	3.96%	1.42%	7.17
<b>Gauteng</b>	8.36%	11.79%	6.02%	35.68%	27.03%	6.66%	4.47%	9.26
<b>Mpumalanga</b>	25.65%	16.66%	6.70%	25.96%	19.18%	4.40%	1.44%	6.71
<b>Limpopo</b>	30.93%	15.17%	6.43%	25.71%	14.66%	5.10%	2.00%	6.31
<b>South Africa</b>	18.12%	17.90%	7.45%	30.67%	18.83%	4.79%	2.25%	7.76

The Northern Cape has the second lowest unemployment rate in South Africa (Table A.4). Disaggregation to the DC level reveals that the Karoo has the highest unemployment rate while Kgalagadi has the lowest.

**Table 7. Unemployment levels by DC in the Northern Cape<sup>6</sup>**

	Employed	Unemployed
<b>Namakwa</b>	66.0%	34.0%
<b>Karoo</b>	58.6%	41.4%
<b>Siyanda</b>	69.2%	30.8%
<b>Frances Baard</b>	57%	43%
<b>Kgalagadi</b>	75.4%	24.6%
<b>Average NC</b>	63.2%	37.3%
<b>Average SA</b>	63.6%	46.4%

A substantial proportion of the employed (27.02%) work in the agricultural, hunting, forestry and fishing industry (Table A.5).

<sup>6</sup> These figures only include those individuals who are active labour market participants.

## 4. DIFFERENCES IN ECONOMIC CONDITIONS FOR MIGRANTS AND NON-MIGRANTS FROM NAMAKWA AND THE KAROO

### 4.1 Methodology

The National Census 2001, weighted by person, will be consulted to provide information about economic conditions for non-migrants and migrants in and from the sending province and the destination province. For all purposes the destination will be the province receiving the migrants while the DC (district council) of origin will refer to the sending DC.

For this paper the DC's of origin are the Namakwa and Karoo district councils in the Northern Cape. The destination province is the Western Cape. The Namakwa and Karoo DC's were chosen for the analysis as they bordered the Western Cape and because of their relative differences in geography, poverty rates and average education levels. The intention was to determine whether migration from two slightly different DC's of origin would have different impacts on its migrants relative to the stationary population.

*The following general caveats should be considered when interpreting the results presented in this paper:*

**“Recent migrants”** refers to those migrants who reported moving in the years 1996 to 2001. **“Permanent migrants”** refers to those migrants who moved before 1996 and were born in the Northern Cape. There will be no attempt to disaggregate these pre-1996 migrants by their DC of origin due to new provincial demarcations after 1996 rendering the Census 1996 and 2001 datasets incomparable at the DC level.

The disaggregation by race excludes Indians as their sample size was too small across certain migration status categories to make meaningful comparisons to other races and other Indians who had or had not migrated. They are therefore excluded on these grounds, but are reincluded when Northern Cape averages are calculated.


For household income and poverty estimates, those households reporting zero income are

excluded as a significant number of households in the Northern Cape (almost 13%) report a zero income. For unemployment estimates, those above the age of 15 but still attending school are excluded. The strict definition is used to define employment.

## 4.2 Poverty rates


The poverty line is set at R 3864 (in 2000 Rands) per capita per annum to determine the poverty headcount ratios by migration status and race group. Households reporting zero income were excluded from calculations as close to 13% of households in the Northern Cape reported earning zero income. The Indian group was also excluded from the analysis by race as the sample size was too small in some migration status categories to make robust conclusions. They were re-included for overall poverty rates across both migration status categories.

**Figure 7. Poverty rates for recent migrants and non-migrants from Namakwa**




Poverty rates are lower for recent migrants to the Western Cape from Namakwa than for residents in Namakwa (figure 7). The difference is relatively pronounced for all groups with poverty levels for recent migrants less than half that of Namakwa residents. The difference in poverty rates between residents of and recent migrants from the Karoo are also quite profound for all race groups.

**Figure 8. Poverty rates for migrants and non-migrants from Karoo<sup>7</sup>**



Census 2001 does not distinguish between different DC's of origin for permanent migrants from the Northern Cape residing in the Western Cape. The variables used in figure 8 are therefore restricted to the provincial level across race groups. There is a clearly visible trend (figure 9) in the reduction of poverty rates for all race groups depending on how long ago they left the sending area. Pre-1996 migrants from the Northern Cape are better off on average than those who migrated to the Western Cape, who in turn are better off than Northern Cape residents who have never migrated.

**Figure 9. Poverty rates for non-migrants, recent migrants and permanent migrants from the Northern Cape**



<sup>7</sup> The poverty rate for recent White migrants from the Karoo is 0% and is therefore not discernible on the graph.

### 4.3 Educational attainment

The literature is unanimous: educational attainment generally is positively related to mobility<sup>8</sup> (White and Woods, 1980), earnings potential and employment probabilities (van der Berg, 2005).

**Table 8. Educational attainment of recent migrants from Namakwa and the Karoo to the Western Cape (working age population not attending school)**


DC of origin	No education	Incomplete primary	Complete primary	Incomplete secondary	Matric	Matric +1yr cert/dip	Matric +Degree	Mean years of education
Namakwa	8.39%	15.54%	8.81%	34.25%	21.89%	7.90%	3.21%	8.76
Karoo	6.07%	16.06%	7.85%	39.12%	23.75%	5.29%	1.86%	8.77
Average NC	16.89%	21.52%	9.16%	31.26%	15.97%	3.81%	1.39%	7.14

As one can see from Table 5 above, the distribution of education amongst recent migrants to the Western Cape differs slightly according to the DC of origin. As groups, migrants from Namakwa have more post-matric education (11.11%) and have more individuals with no education (8.39%) than their counterparts from the Karoo (6.07% and 7.15% respectively). Both groups have more education on average than the provincial average.

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8 Van der Berg (2002) finds evidence that thresholds could exist for educational attainment affecting the probability of migration using migrants from the Eastern Cape for his study.

**Figure 10. Education levels for working-age migrants from and residents in Namakwa and the Karoo**



Note: Individuals attending school were omitted from the sample.

The findings illustrated in Figure 10 suggest that the destination province benefits tremendously at the expense of the sending district council. The destination province receives the more educated individuals of working-age while the sending province or area loses more educated workers. The less educated remain behind in the sending province. The economic consequences for the district council and the province as a whole could lead to possible destabilisation (Cross and Omoluabi, 2006), the degree of which is possibly dependent on the robustness of the relationship between educational attainment and societal welfare.

#### 4.4 Marital status, household composition and tenure status

As discussed in the literature review, migrants are generally less likely to be married than non-migrants. The direction of causality – whether marital status constrains migration or whether migration constrains marital status – will not be analysed here. The sample includes all individuals who are 16 years and older. Although the legal minimum age for marriage is 21 years of age without the need for parental approval (Department of Home Affairs, 2008), the 16 year cut-off was chosen to include traditional marriages and some minors living with partners.

**Table 9. Marital status of migrants and non-migrants from Namakwa and the Karoo**

Area of origin/residence	Migration status	Single	Married	Live with partner	Widowed	Separated/divorced
<b>Namakwa</b>	<i>Permanent residents</i>	44.59%	44.83%	5.26%	2.96%	2.37%
	<i>Recent migrants to WC</i>	53.76%	34.10%	10.40%	1.16%	0.58%
<b>Karoo</b>	<i>Permanent residents</i>	45.77%	36.23%	13.62%	2.88%	1.50%
	<i>Recent migrants to WC</i>	52.05%	29.24%	15.79%	1.17%	1.75%
<b>Average NC</b>	<i>Permanent residents</i>	47.52%	35.80%	12.09%	2.58%	2.07%
	<i>Recent migrants to WC</i>	49.00%	37.78%	9.00%	1.18%	2.29%
	<i>Permanent migrants to WC</i>	34.55%	45.61%	8.76%	7.46%	3.62%
<b>Average WC</b>	<i>Born and reside in WC</i>	40.37%	43.19%	6.12%	6.13%	4.18%

Note: Only individuals over 16 years of age are included in both the Northern and Western Cape samples.

The findings here are in line with previous international and national studies. Recent migrants are more likely to be single than non-migrants in Namakwa and the Karoo. The same is true when one compares the two groups at provincial level. However, permanent migrants from the Northern Cape to the Western Cape are more likely to be married than Northern Cape residents and recent migrants, and surprisingly more likely to be married than residents born and living in the Western Cape.

**Table 10. Mean number of children per household for NC migrants to the Western Cape and NC non-migrants**

DC of origin/DC	Migrants from NC	Non-migrants in NC
Namakwa	0.97	1.90
Frances Baard	1.16	2.29
Kgalagadi	1.18	2.27
Siyanda	1.10	2.00
Karoo	1.60	2.01
Unspecified	1.41	Not applicable
Average	1.34	2.10

From table 10 one can surmise that the number of children per household constrains the household's decision to move. The migrant household has fewer children, regardless of the DC of origin. The non-migrant household has almost double the amount of children for every DC, with a lower but similar pattern for households originally from the Karoo.

**Table 11. Household tenure status of NC non-migrants, recent and permanent migrants from NC to WC**

DC of residence/origin	Migrant status	Owned and fully paid up	Owned but not yet paid up	Rented	Occupy rent-free	N/A (collective quarters)
<b>Namakwa</b>	<i>Non-migrant</i>	<b>56.85%</b>	<b>5.95%</b>	15.03%	<b>13.98%</b>	8.20%
	<i>Recent migrant</i>	<b>22.52%</b>	<b>10.60%</b>	27.81%	<b>25.17%</b>	13.91%
<b>Average NC to WC</b>	<i>Perm migrant</i>	<b>28.85%</b>	<b>23.30%</b>	23.63%	<b>18.26%</b>	5.96%
<b>Karoo</b>	<i>Non-migrant</i>	<b>42.02%</b>	<b>9.68%</b>	19.68%	<b>27.02%</b>	1.59%
	<i>Recent migrant</i>	<b>17.27%</b>	<b>15.83%</b>	25.9%	<b>32.37%</b>	8.63%
<b>Average NC to WC</b>	<i>Perm migrant</i>	<b>28.85%</b>	<b>23.30%</b>	23.63%	<b>18.26%</b>	5.96%

Note: Only household heads are included.

Tenure status of household heads suggests that non-migrants enjoy more housing security

than migrants from the Northern Cape (if ownership implies security). Recent migrants appear to be the least secure of the three groups, which is consistent with previous findings of increasing housing security as settlement becomes more permanent.

## 4.5 Unemployment levels and labour force composition

### 4.5.1 Unemployment levels

Arguably the objective of most migratory decisions is better income and employment prospects. To this end, South African migrants have fared very well compared to their non-migratory counterparts (Kok et al, 2006:184). Table 12 examines whether migrants (recent and pre-1996) from Namakwa and the Karoo experience higher levels of employment than non-migrants from the same DC's. The evidence seems to indicate that migration in pursuit of employment is a worthwhile endeavour as on average residents from Namakwa and the Karoo have lower unemployment rates than individuals who do not migrate. When disaggregated by race, the results are the same for Blacks and Coloureds, but not for recent White migrants from the Karoo. However, at the provincial level the results clearly communicate the benefit of migrating in terms of employment. On average and across races, pre-1996 migrants to the Western Cape have lower unemployment rates than recent migrants, who in turn have lower unemployment rates than non-migrants.


**Table 12. Unemployment levels by migration status and race for the Northern Cape, Namakwa and the Karoo**

		<b>Average</b>	<b>Black</b>	<b>Coloured</b>	<b>White</b>
<b>Residents in:</b>	NC	23.67%	28.69%	24.46%	3.85%
	Namakwa	19.25%	19.57%	21.26%	3.51%
	Karoo	25.90%	33.68%	26.61%	3.02%
<b>Recent migrants from:</b>	NC	15.96%	31.61%	13.00%	4.29%
	Namakwa	7.62%	14.29%	10.50%	0.00%
	Karoo	17.92%	33.33%	15.03%	4.44%
<b>Pre-1996 migrants from:</b>	NC	11.64%	28.23%	11.78%	2.81%

#### 4.5.2 Labour force composition

The labour-force composition by area of origin and migration status for the Black, Coloured and White population groups are examined in this section to determine the broad skills contribution each race makes to the destination province (Western Province) by sending area. The respective samples are also compared to residents born and residing in the Western Cape to establish whether there are differences between locals born and residing in the Western Cape and recent migrants. The disaggregation of migrants by education level or experience (which could afford the analysis more depth) is not attempted here, but the differences in labour-force composition by migration status is instructive nonetheless. The skills contributions of these districts could have a significant economic impact on the destination province as the composition of labour supply could change.


**Figure 11. Black labour force composition at provincial level for migrants and non-migrants in and from the Northern Cape and in the Western Cape**




Black migrants from the Northern Cape are less skilled on average than both Black Northern Cape residents and Black Western Cape residents (figure 11). Recent migrants are also less skilled than pre-1996 migrants, suggesting either a downward shift in migrant skill levels or skills acquisition once the destination province has been reached<sup>9</sup>.

<sup>9</sup> One would have to follow a cohort over time to confirm this. Thus no intertemporal assumptions will be made.

**Figure 12. Black labour force composition by migration status and area of origin**



*Fig 12(a). Namakwa*




*Fig 12(b). Karoo*


From figures 12(a) and (b) that the recent migrants from Namakwa are exclusively semi-skilled and unskilled labour. The Karoo, however contributes a relatively skilled labour force to the Western Cape, leaving a more semi-skilled workforce behind.

For Coloured workers (figure 13), labour market composition also seems to be determined by degree of settlement. Recent migrants from the Northern Cape are relatively less skilled when compared to migrants who had settled earlier who in turn are less skilled than residents born in the Western Cape.


**Figure 13. Coloured labour force composition at provincial level for migrants and non-migrants in and from the Northern Cape and in the Western Cape**



**Figure 14. Coloured labour force composition by migration status and area of origin**




*Fig 14 (a). Namakwa*



*Fig 14(b). Karoo*


Recent Coloured migrants from both Namakwa and the Karoo are generally less skilled than Coloured non-migrants from these areas [figure 14(a) and (b)].

**Figure 14. Coloured labour force composition by migration status and area of origin**




In sharp contrast to Blacks and Coloureds who are largely unskilled and semi-skilled, pre-1996 White migrants have proportionally more skilled workers than their Western Cape resident counterparts, Northern Cape residents and recent migrants from the Northern Cape.

**Figure 16. White labour force composition by migration status and area of origin**



*Fig 16(a). Namakwa*



*Figure 16(b). Karoo*

The White recent migrant labour force is significantly more skilled than the Black and Coloured labour force. Both DC's have more semi-skilled than skilled or unskilled White labour and the recent migrant labour force is similar in skills composition to the recent migrant labour force.

#### **4.6 Incarceration rates by migration status**

If the rational response to poverty or unsatisfactory living conditions is migration in search of better prospects, a possible response to poor unemployment prospects in the destination area could be crime. Census 2001 does not allow for in-depth analysis of differing crime rates by migration status. In lieu of this shortcoming, a crude proxy of crime rates can be constructed using incarceration rates by migration status and race. To the author's knowledge this is the first time that Census data has been used to assess the impact of migration status on incarceration rates. The results offer an insight into the ability of racial groups to obtain support from their networks in their respective destination areas. It also provides an admittedly crude approximation<sup>10</sup> of incarceration rate differences between residents born in the destination area (Western Cape) and migrants to the destination area from Namakwa and the Karoo.

The group chosen for the analysis includes males from the Northern Cape and Western Cape between the ages of 15 and 45. The objective is to ascertain whether incarceration rates differ between residents born in the Western Cape and migrants from the Northern Cape. Although the results are less clear for Black and White migrants, the difficulty in adapting socially to their new environments is quite clear for Coloured migrants and in particular, recent Coloured migrants. On average, recent Coloured migrants have significantly higher incarceration rates (5.12%) than their stationary counterparts in the Northern Cape (3.25%) and the Western Cape (2.35%). When disaggregated by DC, the proportion of recent migrants from the Karoo to the Western Cape in jail (6.02%) is significantly larger than the proportion of recent migrants from Namakwa (2.08%). The results are even more dramatic for all groups when one reduces the sample to include only individuals with an education of Grade 12 or less.

**Table 13. Incarceration rates for males between the ages of 15 and 45 by migration status**

Area of residence/ origin	Migration status	Average	Black	Coloured	White
NC Average	<i>Permanent residents born in NC<sup>11</sup></i>	3.53%	4.55%	3.25%	0.42%
	<i>Recent migrants to WC</i>	2.71%	1.83%	5.12%	0.27%
	<i>Permanent migrants to WC</i>	2.00%	0.63%	3.38%	0.00%
WC resident average	<i>Permanent residents born in WC</i>	2.14%	3.34%	2.35%	0.12%
Namakwa	<i>Recent migrants to WC</i>	1.43%	0.00%	2.08%	0.00%
Karoo	<i>Recent migrants to WC</i>	3.29%	0.00%	6.02%	0.00%
Unspecified region	<i>Recent migrants to WC</i>	3.21%	2.05%	7.51%	0.46%

<sup>10</sup> Details such as duration of the sentence or whether the crime was violent or not are not included.

<sup>11</sup> The disaggregation of permanent residents to DC level does not yield conclusive results as prisons could serve entire provinces, but could be located in specific DC's.

## 4.8 Regression analysis

Logit regression analysis is used in this section to determine the probability of migration to the Western Cape from Namakwa and the Karoo. The variables used in the regression include:

- Age: the population is segmented as follows: 5-14 years, 15-24 years (the reference group), 35 to 44 years, 45 to 54 years, 55 to 65 years, and 66 years and above.
- Gender.
- Race.
- Marital status: a dichotomous variable, reflecting an individual is married (or living together with a partner as husband and wife) or not.
- Number of children.
- Number of elderly aged 60 years or older in the household.
- Educational attainment: five education categories are identified: no, incomplete primary education, incomplete secondary education, Matric, and post-Matric qualifications.
- The unemployment rate in the municipality of origin at the time of the census (Table A9.1). This variable will be used in the Census 2001 regressions, since the 2001 data file only provides information on the migrants' municipality (but not MD) of origin.
- Poverty rate in the municipality of origin. The poverty line used is R3864 per annum in 2000 Rands. To calculate the poverty rate, households earning zero income have been omitted.
- The percentage of the rural population in each DC.

The reference group is Black unmarried males between the ages of 25 and 34 years with no education.

**Table 14. Logit regressions showing probability of migrating to the Western Cape from Namakwa and the Karoo**

<b>Dependent variable: Probability of recent migrants migrating to the Western Cape</b>		
	<b>Recent migrants from Namakwa</b>	<b>Recent migrants from Karoo</b>
% of rural population in DC of origin	-0.0352 [3.97]**	0.0243 [3.93]**
Broad unemployment rate in DC of origin	-0.103 [6.49]**	0.0779 [7.08]**
Married	-0.0379 [0.15]	-0.5326 [2.25]*
Post-Matric education	0.5199 [1.01]	0.9865 [2.06]*
Matric	-0.0656 [0.14]	0.7036 [1.76]
Incomplete secondary	0.358 [0.92]	0.4429 [1.23]
Incomplete primary	0.2322 [0.59]	0.1466 [0.38]
Female	-0.0199 [0.10]	-0.0239 [0.13]
White	2.6889 [4.83]**	0.6758 [2.11]*
Indian	Variable dropped	1.7153 [1.67]
Coloured	2.4082 [4.67]**	0.9143 [4.19]**
Ages 66 and older	-1.4641 [2.34]*	-1.1024 [2.03]*
Ages 55 to 65	-0.6726 [1.60]	-2.0373 [2.77]**
Ages 45 to 54	-0.7617 [1.97]*	-0.9843 [2.45]*
Ages 35 to 44	-0.4959 [1.45]	-0.44 [1.45]
Ages 15 to 24	0.0228 [0.08]	-0.0247 [0.10]
Ages 0 to 14	-0.2133 [0.52]	-1.2108 [2.91]**
Number of children	-0.5474 [5.56]**	-0.32 [4.41]**
Constant	-3.2814 [3.45]**	-9.6397 [13.91]**
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.1199	0.0818
No. of observations	60 506	60 678
Chi-square	185.27	147.95
Probability > Chi-square	0.0000	0.000

Absolute values of Z-statistics in parentheses.

\*\*\* - significant at the 0.001 level

\*\* - significant at the 0.01 level

\* - significant at the 0.05 level

The regressions yield the following results:

- The rural population from Namakwa is less likely to migrate than the urban population, while migrants from the Karoo are more likely to come from rural areas.
- The higher the unemployment rate, the less likely it is that individuals from Namakwa would migrate. However, the probability of migration from the Karoo increases as the unemployment rate increases.
- Being married constrains migration probabilities.
- Being older than 35 years of age reduces the probability of migration and does so with more intensity the older the individual is. In the case of Namakwa, 15 to 24 year olds migrate more than the reference group age band of 25 to 34 years old.
- The number of children also has a negative, significant relationship with the probability of migration.

#### **4.7 Conclusion**

Census 2001 reveals that migration from Namakwa and the Karoo to the Western Cape is roughly consistent with theory and previous international and national studies. Poverty rates differ substantially between permanent residents, recent migrants and permanent residents. At the provincial level Black and Coloured permanent migrants are less likely to be poor than recent migrants who in turn are less likely to be poor than residents in the sending province. Recent migrants from the Karoo exhibit lower poverty rates than non-migrants from the Karoo for all race categories, while only Black recent migrants do not fare better than their non-migrant counterparts.

The distribution of education amongst recent migrants and residents differs significantly, possibly indicating migration's education-selectivity. The implications for both sending and destination provinces are extensive. Recent migrants are more educated than their non-migrant peers from both regions, which could indicate an exodus of potential skills from a relatively deprived province to a more affluent province. Migrants from the Karoo and Namakwa are more likely to be single and have fewer children than non-migrants for both regions and enjoy less housing security than migrants and non-migrants.

On average, permanent migrants from the Northern Cape are less likely to be employed than

recent migrants who in turn fare better than non-migrants in the employment stakes. The evidence is suggestive of an improvement in employment probabilities once migrants have moved and even more improvement once they have settled in the area.

The labour market composition by race and migration status was examined to determine whether migrants are more skilled than their non-migrant counterparts from the sending region and their position relative to residents born in the receiving area. At the provincial level, Black and Coloured permanent migrants are more skilled than recent migrants who are more skilled than permanent residents in the Northern Cape. However, they are less skilled than Western Cape residents. When disaggregated by DC, Namakwa and the Karoo send significant numbers of unskilled labour to the Western Cape. The vulnerability of unskilled labourers in the face of rapid globalisation and an increasing demand for skills is particularly relevant for provincial planners.

Incarceration rates by migration status were also examined to approximate the migrant's ability to successfully adapt to a new environment. Although the results are not conclusive for all races, recent Coloured migrants are less able to adapt socially than their non-migrant counterparts. Pre-1996 Coloured migrants from the Northern Cape are less likely to be in jail than their recent migrant peers, once again highlighting the relative vulnerability of recent migrants in their destination area.

The conditions faced by permanent and recent migrants and non-migrants differ substantially. The evidence suggests that migration is a worthwhile alternative to poverty in the sending area. However, once the migrant has arrived in the sending area, the ability of the migrant to adapt to his new environment is tested by less housing security and higher probabilities of being in jail than in the sending area. The possible losses experienced by the sending area due to the relatively higher education levels of recent migrants relative to non-migrants warrants serious consideration by Northern Cape provincial planners.

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## APPENDIX

**Table A.1 Estimating Female Labour Migration from Rural Areas, 1993**

	Dependent Variable 1 = African Female Migrant Worker
Married	-.97138* (.06793)
Resident Employed Men	-.09620** (.04888)
Male Migrant Workers	.27329* (.02942)
Land Size	-.06978* (.02761)
Children Aged 6 years or younger	-.04268** (.02069)
Children Aged 7 to 14 years	.03528** (.01809)
Women of Pension Age (60 and older)	.14308* (.05326)
Years of Education	.02270* (.00712)
Age	.22038* (.01607)
(Age) <sup>2</sup>	-.00271* (.00022)
Constant	-5.47417* (.33343)
Number of Observations	6041

1. Indicator variables for province were included in the estimation although the results are not reported here. 2. The regression is weighted. 3. Standard errors in parentheses. 4. \* Significant at the 1 percent level; \*\* Significant at the 5 percent level.

Source: Posel and Casale (2003:8).

**Table A.2 Provinces by area type**

	Urban	Rural
Western Cape	90.95	9.05
Eastern Cape	38.01	61.99
Northern Cape	83.32	16.68
Free State	78.12	21.88
KwaZulu Natal	44.71	55.29
North West	41.08	58.92
Gauteng	97.26	2.74
Mpumalanga	42.65	57.35
Limpopo	10.36	89.64
Average South Africa	56.86	43.14

**Table A.3 Mean household size by race and province**

	Black		Coloured		Indian		White		All	
	1996	2001	1996	2001	1996	2001	1996	2001	1996	2001
Western Cape	3.57	3.46	4.47	4.39	4.10	4.08	2.66	2.59	3.73	3.67
Eastern Cape	4.47	4.23	4.73	4.52	3.94	3.69	2.86	2.80	4.37	4.15
Northern Cape	4.04	3.74	4.45	4.24	4.07	3.28	2.81	2.74	4.00	3.81
Free State	3.97	3.71	3.96	3.99	3.44	3.56	2.91	2.85	3.79	3.63
KwaZulu Natal	4.86	4.44	4.17	3.89	4.23	4.01	2.78	2.64	4.53	4.25
North West	4.34	3.85	4.42	4.17	3.92	3.89	3.01	3.00	4.21	3.80
Gauteng	3.51	3.23	4.14	4.11	3.99	3.83	2.99	2.92	3.39	3.21
Mpumalanga	4.43	4.16	4.20	4.03	4.33	3.82	3.24	3.12	4.27	4.07
Limpopo	4.68	4.35	3.95	3.89	4.33	3.83	3.05	3.02	4.62	4.31
South Africa	4.30	3.95	4.44	4.33	4.18	3.96	2.89	2.81	4.08	3.84

Source: Moses and Yu (2008).

**Table A.4 Labour force participation and unemployment rates by province**

	LFPR (% of working age population)	Unemployed (%)	Employed (%)
Western Cape	68.75	28.87	71.13
Eastern Cape	52.56	60.52	39.48
Northern Cape	63.22	37.28	62.72
Free State	64.54	47.38	52.62
KwaZulu Natal	60.29	53.41	46.59
North West	63.6	49.61	50.39
Gauteng	75.05	39.52	60.48
Mpumalanga	61.88	46.17	53.83
Limpopo	53.18	57.32	42.68
South Africa	63.53	46.43	53.57

**Table A.5 Percentage of the employed per broad industry category**

	<b>Western Cape</b>	<b>Eastern Cape</b>	<b>Northern Cape</b>	<b>Free State</b>	<b>KwaZulu Natal</b>	<b>North West</b>	<b>Gauteng</b>	<b>Mpumalanga</b>	<b>Limpopo</b>
Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing	13.66%	9.66%	27.02%	17.93%	8.97%	10.87%	2.38%	18.84%	18.32%
Mining and Quarrying	0.34%	0.6%	7.44%	6.85%	0.56%	17.51%	3.35%	7.57%	4.03%
Manufacturing	13.8%	11.9%	5.16%	8.35%	16.7%	9.24%	13.8%	11.2%	6.65%
Electricity, gas and water supply	0.48%	0.5%	0.76%	0.69%	0.63%	0.55%	0.75%	1.78%	1.11%
Construction	7%	4.9%	4.4%	3.9%	4.9%	4.8%	5.6%	6%	5.4%
Wholesale and retail trade	16.2%	13.6%	11.2%	12.3%	15.1%	14%	16.6%	13.8%	13.7%
Transport, storage and communication	4.35%	3.65%	2.83%	3.46%	5.07%	3.5%	5.87%	3.5%	3.45%
Financial, insurance, real estate and business services	10.56%	6.66%	4.85%	5.6%	8.3%	5.12%	14.22%	5.02%	5.07%
Community, social and personal services	17.26%	26.16%	18.01%	18.46%	19.69%	19.25%	17.74%	14.74%	23.92%
Private households	6.32%	11.8%	10.3%	14.4%	9.2%	10.6%	9.76%	11%	11%
Others/ unspecified	10.1%	10.6%	7.82%	8.03%	11%	4.63%	9.99%	6.62%	7.4%